Constitution of India, Art. 19, cls. {I) (a) and (2), 32-Application under Art. 32-Preliminary ob1ection-Fundamental right of freedom of speech and expression-Law imposing restrictions for securing public order and maintenance of public safety-Validity-- Severability of Act-Madras Maintenance of Public Order Act (XXXIll of 1949), s. 9 ( 1-A)-Validity. 

Held, by the Full Court (i) (overruling o preliminary objections) -Under the Constitution the Supreme Court is constituted the protector and  guarantor of fundamental rights, and it cannot, consistently with the responsibility so laid upon it, refuse to entertain applications seeking protection against infringement of such right although such applications are made to the Court in the first instance without resort to a High Court having concurrent juris-diction in the matter.  

Urguhar v. Brown (205 U. S. 179.) and Hooney v. Kolohan (294 U. S. 103) distinguished. 

(ii) Freedom of speech and expression includes freedom of propogation of ideas and that freedom is ensured by the freedom of circulation.

Ex parte Jackson (96 U. S. 727) and Lovell v. City of Griffin (303 U. S. 444) referred to. 

Held per KANIA C. J., PATANJAL.I SASTRI, MEHR CHAND MAHAJAN, MUKHERJEA and DAs JJ.-(FAZL ALI. dissenting): (i) Apart from libel, slander etc. unless a law restricting freedom of speech and expression is directed solely against the undermining of the security of the State or the overthrow of it, such law cannot fall within the reservation under cl. (2) of the Art. 19 of the Constitution, although the restrictions which it seeks to impose may have been conceived generally in the interests of public order. Section 9 (1-A) of the Madras Maintenance of Public Order Act, XXXlll of 1949, which authorises impositions of restrictions for the wider purpose of securing public safety or the maintenance of public order falls outside the scope of authorised restrictions under cl. (2) and is therefore void and unconstitutional; (ii) Where a la' purports to authorize the imposition of restrictions on a fundamental right in language wide enough to cover restrictions both within and without the limits of constitutionally permissible legislative action. affecting such right, it is not possible to uphold it even so I far as it may be applied within the constitutional limits, as it is1 not severable. So long as the possibility of its being applied for purposes not sanctioned by the Constitution cannot be ruled out it must be held to be wholly unconstitutional and void. Section 9 (1-A) is therefore wholly unconstitutional and void.

Per FAZL ALI Restrictions which s. 9 (1-A) authorised are within the provisions of cl. (2) of art. 19 of the Constitution and s. 9 (1-A) is not therefore unconstitutional or void. ( 1 ).