A B [2015] 1 S.C.R.504 VINOD KUMAR V. STATEOF PUNJAB (CriminalAppeal No. 554 of 2012) JANUARY 21, 2015. [DIPAKMISRA AND ROHINTONFALi NARIMAN, JJ.] Prevention of Corruption Act, 1988 - ss. 7 and 13(2) - Publicservanttaking illegal gratification-Publicservant- C octroi inspectoracceptingbribe -Convictionand sentence ulss. 7 and 13(2) on basis of thetrap laid, examinationand cross-examination of theprosecutionwitnesses by thecourts below- On appealheld: On facts, presumptioncan be drawn that the inspectorhad received or acceptedthe saidcurrency D notes on his own volition -Testimony of PW6,an independentwitness and PW-7show that the prosecutionwas ableto provedemand,acceptance fWd recovery of the amount- Though PW 7 was cross-examinedafter 20 months whichresulted in his pre-varication from theexamination-in- E chief, he was declaredhostile and re-examined,reading the evidence in entirety, his evidencecannot be brushedaside - Thus, orderpassedby thecourtsbelow upheld. Criminaltrial -Inordinatedelay in holding trial in respect of seriousoffencesrelating to corruption-Adjournments F soughtby thecounselfor cross-examination-Duty of the court-Held:Adjournmentssought on thedrop of a hatby thecounsel,even thoughthe witnessis presentin court,is contrary to allprinciples of holdinga trial-It isnecessarythat if the examination-in-chiefis over,the cross-examination G shouldbe completedon thesameday - If the examination of a witnesscontinuestill latehoursthe trialcanbe adjourned to thenextday for cross-examination-Cross-examination shouldnot be deferredfor a longtime - Special reasonsare H 504 VINOD KUMAR v. STATE OF PUNJAB505 to be recordedfor grant of timebut thesameis nottakennote A of - If adjournmentsare granted in thismanner it would tantamount to violation of rule of lawandeventuallyturn such trials to afarce-Trialjudgesdirected to follow the principles relating to trial in arequisitemanner and not to defercross­ examination of awitnessat theirpleasure or at theleisure of B thedefencecounsel,for it eventuallymakes the trialan apologyfor trialandcompelsthe wholesocietyto suffer chicanery-Administration of criminaljustice -Practiceand procedure-Adjournments. Dismissingthe appeal, the Court c HELD: 1. Mererecovery of the taintedmoney is not sufficient to recorda conviction unless there is evidence that bribe had been demanded or money was paid voluntarily asbribe. In theabsence of any evidence of D demand and acceptance of the amount as illegal gratification, recovery would not alonebe a ground to convict theaccused. PW6-clerk supportedthe recovery inentirety. He stood firmand remainedunshakenin the cross-examination and nothing has been elicited to E dislodgehis testimony.Further, from. the testimony of PW 7 it is absolutelyclear that he supportedin entirety about the demand, acceptance andrecovery of money.PW7 was examined-in-chief on 30.9.1999 and was cross­ examinedon 25.5.2001, almost after 1 yearand 8 months.F The delay insaidcross-examination,had given enough time for prevaricationdue to many a reason.A fair trial is to be fair both to the defenceand the prosecutionas well as to the victim. An offence registered under the Prevention of Corruption Act is to be tried with all G seriousness.There is failure to appreciate how the trial Judge could exhibit such laxity in granting so much time_,,. · for cross-examinationin a case of this nature. It would havebeenabsolutelyappropriateon the part of thetrial Judge to finishthe cross-examinationon thedaythe saidH 506 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2015] 1 S.C.R. A witness was examined. As is evident, for no reason whatsoever it was deferredand the cross-examination took place after 20 months. The witnesshad all the time inthe world to begainedover. He was declared hostile and re-examined.Reading the evidencein entirety, the Bevidence of PW-7cannot be brushedaside. However,part of his testimony does not commend acceptancein the backdrop of entire evidencein examination-in-chiefand the re-examination. Further, the evidence of PW6 and PW7 have got corroborationfrom PW8. He in all material c particulars stated about the recovery and proven the necessary documents pertainingto thetestcarried with phenolphthalein powder.The appellant was caught red­ handed with the currencynotes smeared with the powder by PW 8. The appellant in hisstatementrecorded under 0 Section 313 CrPC took the plea thathe is innocent and was falsely implicated dueto animosity.No explanation wasgivenas regardsthe recovery.Therefore,legitimately a presumption can be drawnthat the accused-appellant hadreceived or acceptedthe saidcurrencynotes on his E own volition. The factum of presumption and the testimony of PW6 and7 goa longway to show that the prosecutionwas ableto provedemand,acceptanceand recovery of theamount.Thus, the trial judge andthe High Court appositely concluded that the charges leveled against the accused have duly been proven by the F prosecution. It is not a case that there is no other evidencebarring the evidence of the complainant.On the contrary there are adequate circumstances which establish the ingredients of the offences in respect of which he was charged. [Para 39-40] [537-A-D;538-D-H; G539-D-G;540-8-D] 2. Agony and anguishis expressedin themannerin which trials jn respect of serious offences relating to corruption are being conducted by the trial courts. H Adjournments are sought on the drop of a hat by the VINOD KUMAR v. STATE OF PUNJAB 507 counsel, even though the witness is present in court, contrary to all principles of holding a trial. That apart,after the examination-in-chief of a witness is over, adjournment is sought for cross-examination and the disquieting featureis that the trial courts grant time. The law requires special reasons to be recorded for grant of time but the sameis not taken note of. Therehas to be a fair and proper trial but the duty of the court while conducting the trial to beguidedby themandate of the law, the conceptual fairness andabove all bearing in mind A B its sacrosanct duty to arrive at thetruthon th.e basis of c the material brought on record. If an accused for his benefit takes the ttial on the path of total mockery, it cannot be countenanced. The Court has a sacred duty to see that the trial is conducted as per law. If adjournments are granted in this manner it would tantamount to violation of rule of law and eventually turn such trials to a farce. It is legally impermissible and jurisprudentially abominable. The trial courts are expectedin law to follow the command of the procedure relating to trial and not yield to therequest of the counsel to grant adjournment for non-accepta~ble reasons. In fact, it is not all appreciable to call a witness for cross­ exam ination after such a long span of time. It is imperative if theexamination-in-chiefis over,the cross­ examination should be completed on thesameday. If the examination of a witness continues tilllate hours the trial canbe adjourned to the next day for cross-examination. It is inconceivable in law that the cross-examination should bedeferred for such a longtime. It is anathema D E F to the concept of proper and fair trial. The duty of the court is to see that not only theinterest of the accusedG asper law is protected but also the societal and collective interest is safe-guarded. It is distressing to note that despite series of judgments of this Court, the habit of granting adjournment, really an ailment, continues.There isa constant discomfort. Therefore, it is appropriate that H 508 SUPREMECOURT REPORTS [2015] 1 S.C.R. A thecopies of the judgment be sent to the Chief Justices of all the HighCourts for circulating the sameamongthe trial Judges with a command to follow the principles relating to trial in a requisitemanner and not to defer the cross-examination of a witness at their pleasure or at the B leisure of thedefence counsel, for it eventually makesthe trial an apology for trial and compels the whole society to suffer chicanery. Law cannot allowed to be lonely; a destitute. [Para 41][540-G-H;541-A-G] Gumaib Singh V. State of Punjab 2013 (3) SCR 563 = C (2013)7 SCC 108; SwaranSingh V. State of Punjab 2000 (3) SCR 572 = 2000 (5) SCC 668, State of U.P. V. Shambu Nath Singh (2001) 5 SCC 667, Raghubir Singh V. State of Haryana 1974(2) SCR 799: 1974(4) SCC 560; Madhukar BhaskarraoJoshi V. State of Maharashtra 2000 (4) Suppl. D SCR 475 = 2000 (8) SCC 571; B. Jayaraj V. State of Andhra Pradesh (2014)4 SCALE 81; M.R. Purushotham Vs. State of Kamataka (2014) 11 SCALE 467; Sat Paul V. Delhi Administration 1976 (2) SCR 11 =1976(1 ) SCC 727; State of Bihar V. Basawan Singh (CB) (1959) SCR 195, Major E.G. E Barsey V. State of Bombay (1962)2 SCR 195, Bhanupratap HariprasadDave V. State of Gujarat (1969) 1 SCR 22; MO Shamshuddin V. State of Kera/a 1995 ( 2) SCR 900 = 1995 (3) SCC 351; C. M. G Babu V. C. B. I., Cochin 2009 (2) SCR 1-021 = 2009 (3 ) SCC 779;and BenarsiDas V. State F of Haryana 2010 (4 ) SCR 383= 2010 (4 ) SCC450; Shiv Bahadur Singh V. State of VindhyaPradesh 1954 SCR 1038 =AIR 1954 SC 322 , Bhagwan Singh V. State of Rajasthan 1976(1) SCC 15 , Megha Singh V. State of Haryana 1996 (11 ) SCC709, State vs. V. Jayapau/ (2004) G5 SCC 223 State of U.P. V. BhagwantKishore Joshi 1964 SCR 71 = 1964 AIR 221, S.Jeevanatham V. State (through Inspector of Police, TN.) 2004 (1 ) Suppl.SCR 607 = 2004 (5) SCC230; Bhagwan Singh V. State of Haryana 1976(2) SCR 921 = 1976(1) SCC 389, Khuji@ Surendra Tiwari V. H State of Madhya Pradesh1991( 3) SCR 1 = 1991 ( 3) SCC VINOD KUMAR v. STATE OF PUNJAB 509 627, RabindraKumar Dey V. State of Orissa 1977 (1) SCR A 439 = 1976(4) SCC 233; and Syad Akbar V. State of Karnataka 1980 (1) SCR 95 = 1980 (1) SCC 30, Rammi @ Rameshwar V. State of Madhya Pradesh 1999 (3 ) Suppl. SCR 1 = 1999(8 ) SCC 649,Hazari Lal v. State (Delhi Administration) 1980 (2) SCR 1051 = 1980 (2) SCC390;Sita B Ram v. State of Rajasthan1975 ( 2) SCC 227; M. Narsinga Rao v. State of A.P2000 (5) Suppl.SCR 584 = 2001 (1 ) SCC 691; Suraj Mal v. State (Delhi Admn.) 1979 (4) SCC 725; Suresh Budharmal Kalani v. State of Maharashtra1998( 1) Suppl. SCR 608 = 1998(7) SCC c 337;M.R.Purushotham v. State of Karnataka 2014 (11) SCALE 467; T. Subramanian v. The State of Tamil Nadu 2006 (1 ) SCR 180 = 2006 (1 ) SCC 401, Madhukar BhaskarraoJoshi v. State of Maharashtra 2000 (4) Suppl. SCR 475 = 2000 ( 8) SCC 571 ,RajRajendra SinghSeth v. D State of Jharkhandand Anr. 2008 (11 ) SCR 66 = 2008 (11) SCC 681; State of Maharashtra v. DnyaneshwarLaxman Rao Wankhede 2009 (11 ) SCR 513 = 2009 (15) SCC200, C.M. Girish Babu v. C.B.I., Cochin 2009 (2 ) SCR 1021 = 2009AIR 2022, K. S. Panduranga v. State of Karnataka 2013 E (4 ) SCR 155 = 2013 (3 ) SCC 721 and SatvirSingh v. State of Delhi (2014)13 SCC 143 -referredto. Hawkins v. Powells Tillery Steam Coal Co. Ltd(1911)1 KB 988 : 1911 WN 53 DPP V. Hester(1972) 3 All ER 1056; OPP V. Kilbourne(1973) 1 All ER 440- referredto. F Case Law Reference 2013 (3) SCR 563 referred to para4 2000 (3) SCR 572 referred to para5 G (2001) 5 sec 667 referred to para 6 1974(2) SCR 799 referred to para13 2000 (4) Suppl.SCR 475 referredto para13 H 510 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2015] 1 S.C.R. A (2014) 4 SCALE 81 referred to para 14 (2014) 11 SCALE 467 referred to para 14 1976 (2) SCR 11 referred to para15 B (1959) SCR 195referred to para 15 (1962)2 SCR 195referred to para 15,20 (1969) 1 SCR 22 referred to para 15,21 1995 (2) SCR900 referred to para 15,22 c 2009 (2) SCR 1021 referred to para 16 2010 (4) SCR 383referred to para 16 1954 SCR1038 referred to para 19 D 1976 (1) sec 15referred to para 23 1996 (11) sec 109 referred tcf para 24,26 (2004) 5 sec 223 referred to para 25,27 E 1964 SCR 71 referred to para25,26 2004 (1) Suppl.SCR 607 referred to para27,28 1976 (2) SCR 921 referred to para 29 F 1991 (3) SCR 1referred to para 29 1977 (1) SCR 439 referred to para 29 1980 (1) SCR 95referred to para 29 1999 (3) Suppl.SCR 1 referred to para 30 G 1980 (2) SCR 1051 referred to para 33 1975 (2) sec 221 referred to para 34 2000 (5) Suppl.SCR 584 referred to para 35 H VINOD KUMAR v. STATE OF PUNJAB 511 1979(4) sec 725referred to para35 1998(1) Suppl.SCR 608 referredto para35 2014 (11) SCALE 467 referred to para 38 2006 (1) SCR 180 referredto para39 2000 (4) Suppl.SCR 475 referredto para39 2008 (11) SCR 66 referred to para 39 2009 (11) SCR 513referred to para39 2009AIR 2022 referredto para39 2013 (4) SCR 155referredpara 39 (2014)13 sec 143 referred to para 39 CRIMINAL APPELLATE JURISDICTION:Criminal Appeal No.554of 2012. Fromthe Judgmentand Order dated 13.10.2011 of the High Court of Punjaband Haryanaat Chandigarh in CRA No.A B c D 1280-SB of 2001 (0 & M) E Sushil Kumarjain, PuneetJain, KhushbhuJain, Abhinay Gupta,Manu Maheshwari,Pratibha Jain for the Appellant. V. Madhukar,AAG, AnvitaCowshish,Kuldeep Singh tor therespondent. TheJudgment of the Court wasdeliveredby. F D.IPAK MISRA, J. 1. If one is askeda question,what afflictsthe legally requisitecriminal trial in its conceptualG eventuality in thiscountrythe tworeasonsthat mayearnthe status of phenomenalsignification are, first,procrastination of trial due to non-availabilityof witnesseswhen the trial is in progressand second,unwarrantedadjournmentssought by the H 512 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2015] 1 S.C.R. A counsel conductingthe trial and the unfathomable reasonsfor acceptation of suchprayersfor adjournmentsby the trial courts, despitea statutorycommandunder Section 309 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (CrPC) and series of pronouncementsby thisCourt.What was a malady at onetime, Bwiththe efflux of time,has metamorphosedinto malignancy. What was a meredisturbanceonce has becomea disorder,a diseasedone, at present. 2. Theinstantcase frescoesand depictsa scenariothat c exemplifies how due to passivity of the learnedtrial Judge, a witness,despite having stood embeddedabsolutely firmly in his examination-in-chief, has audaciously and, in a way, obnoxiously, thrown all the values tothewind,and pavedthe path of tergiversation. It would not be a hyperbole tosaythatit o is a maladroit and ingeniously designedattempt to strangulate and crucifythe fundamental purpose of trial, that is, to arriveat thetruthon thebasis of evidence on record.The redeeming featureis, despitethe malevolent and injurious assault, the cause of justicehas survived,for thereis, in the ultimate Eeventuate,a convictionwhich is under assail in this appeal, by specialleave. 3. The narration of the sad chronology shocksthe judicial conscienceand gravitatesthe mindto posea question,is it Fjustifiedfor anyconscientious trial Judgeto ign_ore the statutory command,not recognize "thefelt necessities of time" and remainimperviousto thecry of the collective askingfor justice orgive an indecentand uncalled for burial to theconception of trial,totally ostracizingthe conceptthat a civilized and orderly G societythrives on rule of law which includes"fair trial" for the accusedas well as theprosecution. 4. In the aforesaidcontext, we may recapitulate a passage from Gurnaib Singh V. State of Punjab. 1 H 1. (2013) 7 sec 10s. VINOD KUMAR v. STATE OF PUNJAB 513 [DIPAKMISRA, J.] " ...... We are compelledto proceedto reiteratethe law and expressour anguishpertainingto themanner in whichthe trial was conductedas it depictsa verydisturbingscenario. As is demonstrable from the record, the trial was conducted in an extremely haphazard and piecemeal manner.Adjournmentswere grantedon a mereasking. The cross-examination of the witnesses was deferred without recording any special reasonand dates were givenafter a longgap.The mandate of the law and the viewsexpressedby this Court fromtime to timeappears tohavebeentotallykept at bay.The learnedtrial Judge, asis perceptible, seems to have ostracised fromhis memorythat a criminal trial hasits owngravityand sanctity. In this regard, we may refer with profit to the pronouncement in Ta/ab Haji Hussain v.· Madhukar Purshottam Mondkai' whereinit hasbeenstatedthat an accusedperson by hisconductcannot put a fairtrialinto jeopardy,for it istheprimaryand paramountduty of the criminalcourts to ensurethat the riskto fairtrial is removed andtrialsare allowedto proceed smoothly withoutany interruptionor obstruction." 5. Be it noted, in thesaidcase,the followingpassage from Swaran Singh V. State of Punjab 3 , wasreproduced. "It has becomemore or lessa fashionto havea criminal caseadjournedagain and again till the witnesstires and givesup. It is thegame of unscrupulouslawyers to get adjournmentsfor oneexcuse or the other till a witnessis wonoveror is tired.Not onlyis a witnessthreatened,he isabducted,he is maimed,he is doneawaywith, or even bribed.There is noprotectionfor him. In adjourningthe matterwithout anyvalid causea courtunwittinglybecomes partyto miscarriage of justice." 2. AIR 1958 SC 376. 3. (2000) 5 sec 668. A 8 c D E F G H A B c D E 514 SUPREME COURT REPORTS[2015] 1 S.C.R. 6. In this regard,it isalsofruitfulto referto theauthorityin State of UP. V. Shambu Nath Singh 4 , wherein thtsCourt deprecatingthe practice of a Sessions Court adjourninga case in spite of thepresence of the witnesses willing to beexamined fully, opinedthus: "9. We make it abundantlyclear that if a witnessis present in courthe mustbe examinedon thatday.The courtmust knowthat mostof thewitnesses could attendthe court only at heavy cost to them,after keepingaside their own avocation. Certainly theyincursufferingand loss of income. Themeagreamount of bhatta (allowance) which a witness maybe paidby thecourtis generally a poorsolacefor the financial loss incurredby him. It is a sadplight in the trial courtsthat witnesseswho are called throughsummonsor otherprocessesstand at thedoorstepfrom morning till evening only to be told at theend of the daythatthe case isadjournedto anotherday. Thisprimitivepractice must bereformedby thepresidingofficers of the trial courts and itcanbe reformedby everyoneprovided the presiding officerconcernedhas a commitmenttowards duty." 7. With the aforesaid concern and agony, we shall presently proceedto adumbratethe necessitousfacts. We have alreadystated that despitethe impasse,there is a conviction bythe trial Judgeand an affirmationthereof by theHighCourt. FElucidatingthe factualscore, be it noted,the instantappealis directedagainst the judgment and orderdated 13.10.2011 passedby theHigh Court of Punjaband Haryanaat Chandigarh in Criminal AppealNo. 1280-SB of 2001 (O&M) whereinthe learned Single Judgehas giventhe stamp of approvalto the Gjudgmentand orderdated 24.10.2001 passedby thelearned Special Judge,Patiala wherebyhe hadconvictedthe appellant under Section 7and13(2) of the Prevention of CorruptionAct, 1988(for brevity,'the Act')and sentencedhim to undergo H 4. (2001) 5 sec 667. VINOD KUMAR v. STATE OF PUNJAB 515 [DIPAK MISRA, J.] rigorousimprisonmentfor a periodof twoyearsand to payaA fineof Rs.2,000/- witha defaultclause. 8. The prosecutioncase, as has been unfurled, is that Baj Singh,PW-5, used to bring earth in tractor trolley withinthe municipal area of Rajpura.The appellant, at the relevant time, wasposted as Octroilnspector·and he demandedRs.20/-per trolley for permittinghim to enterinto the municipal area. Eventually, a deal was struckthat the accused-appellant would B be paid Rs.500/- permonthfor thesmoothoperation.As the prosecutionstory further unfolds, on 25.1.1995, Baj Singh met C JagdishVerma, PW-7, and disclosed before him the factabout the demandof theaccusedfor permitting the entryof thetractor trolley insidethe municipal area and thereafter, as he was not desirousof obliging the accused, he narratedthe entirestory to DSP Vigilance, who in his turn,with the intention to lay the trap, explained it to Baj Singh,PW-5, and JagdishVerma, PW- D 7aboutthe procedureof thetrap.As alleged, Baj Singh gave fivenotesof Rs.100/- to the DSP Vigilance who notedthe numbersof thenotesand completed other formalitieslike applyingphenolphthalein powder on the currencynotes. Thereafter,they proceeded to the place of theaccusedand a trapwas laid.Eventually, currencynotes amounting to Rs.500/ E -wererecoveredfrom the trouserof the appellant andwere takeninto possession.The statementsof thewitnesseswere recordedand after completing the investigationchargesheet was placed fortheoffences punishable under Sections 7 and 13(2)of theAct. 9. To bringhomethe chargesagainst the accused­ appellant, the prosecutionexamined eight witnesses. PW-1 to PW-4 are formal witnesses. PW-5, the complainantresiled from hisprevious statement andwascross-examinedby the prosecution. SherSingh,PW-6, a clerk in the office of Tehsildar, Rajpura had joined the police party as an independentwitness. He supported the case of the prosecution in detail. JagdishVerma, PW-7, in his examination-in-chief, F G H 516 SUPREME COURT REPORTS[2015] 1 S.C.R. A supportedthe prosecutioncase in all aspects, but in cross­ examination, resiled fromhis examination-in-chief.The witness, PW-7,was declaredhostile on a prayerbeing madeby the Public Prosecutorand wasre-examined.Narinder Pal Kaushal, PW-8, DSP of VigilanceBureau who had led the raidingparty Bon 25.1.1995, in hisdeposition,deposed in detail aboutthe conductingof theraidandrecoveryof theamount. 10. Theaccused, in his statementunder Section 313 CrPC,deniedthe allegations and tookthe plea of false implicationdue to party faction and animosity. It was his further C standthat he wasbroughtfrom his officeand wastakento the officeof thic Tehsildarand thereafterto theVigilanceoffice. 11. The learnedtrial Judge, on the basisof theevidence brought on record,came to hold that thoughthe complainant Dhadnot supportedthe case of the prosecutionyet prosecution hadbeenable to provethe demandand acceptance of the bribeand the recovery of the taintedmoney from the accused and,therefore,the presumption as envisagedunder Section 20 of theActwouldget attracted and accordinglyconvicted the Eaccused and sentencedhim, as hasbeenstatedhereinbefore. 12. In appeal,it wascontendedbefore the HighCourtthat whenthe testimonyof Baj Singh, PW-5, and JagdishVerma, PW-7,the shadowwitness,was absolutely incredible,the same couldnot havebeen pervertedly filtered by the learned trial F Judge toconvictthe accused-appe11antfor thecrimein question. It wasalsourgedthat mererecoveryof thecurrency noteswouldnot constitutethe offenceunder Section 7 of the Act. It wasalsopropoundedthat the offenceunder Section 13(2) of theAct would not getattractedunless the demand and G acceptancewere proven.Non-involvementof anyindependent witness in theraidwas alsoseriously criticised.The HighCourt posedthe questionwhether the prosecutionhad beenable to provethe factumof demandof bribe,its acceptanceand the recoveryof the money from the possessionof theaccused.With Hregardto demandof bribe,the High Courtplaced reliance on VINOD KUMAR v. STATE OF PUNJAB 517 [DIPAK ~ISRA, J.] thetestimonyof theindependentwitness Sher Singh,PW-6,A andthe examination-in-chiefof JagdishVerma, PW-7, and cameto hold that the demand.of bribe had beenproven. It appreciatedthe deposition of PW- 7 andthe documents, especially,the Chemical Examiner'sreport of thehandwash liquid and cameto hold there had been acceptanceof bribe.B Relating to the recoveryof thetaintedmoney,the HighCourt tooknoteof thefactthatthe ocular testimonyhad been duly corroboratedby thedocumentaryevidence and hence,the recoveryhad beenproved. 13. Be itnoted,the HighCourt placedreliance upon C Raghubir Singh V. State of Haryana 5 and Madhukar BhaskarraoJoshi V. State of Maharashtra 6 and eventually cameto hold that the prosecutionhad provenits case to the hilt and resultantly affirmedthe conviction and orderof sentence passedby the trial Court,but reducedthe sentenceof 2 years'D rigorousimprisonment to one year. 14. Criticizingthe conviction as recordedby the learned trial Judgeand affirmedby theHighCourt, it is submittedby Mr. Jain, learned senior counsel for theappellantthat whenthe informant had notsupportedthe caseof theprosecution,it wasE notjustifiable on thepartof the learnedtrial Judge to record a convictionagainst the accused. It is his submissionthat on the basisof thetestimonyof PW-6 to PW-8,the conviction could not have been recorded,for SherSingh,PW-6, is not a witness either to thedemandor acceptanceof the bribe by the appellantF and further the versionPW-7 requires careful scrutiny,regard beinghad to the factthat he is a hostile witness. It is also urged thatthe evidenceof PW-8deserves to be discarded as he is an interestedwitness. To bolster the aforesaidsubmissions, learned senior counsel has drawninspirationfrom B. Jayaraj G V. State of Andhra Pradesh 7 and M. R. Purushotham Vs. State of Karnataka 8 . 5. (1974)4 sec 560. 6 (2000) 8 sec 571. 7. (2014) 4 SCALE 81. 8. (2014) 11 SCALE 467. H 518 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2015] 1 S.C.R. A 15. Apart from above,it is further put forth by him thatas PW-7has not supportedthe prosecutionstory and stated to have been tutoredto givestatement, his whole testimony should havebeenthrownout of considerationand no relianceshould have been placed on it. It is contendedby himthatthe High B Court has failed to appreciate theimportance of cross­ examinationof PW-7and hence,the judgmentaffirming the conviction is absolutelyflawed. To buttress the saidsubmission, reliance has been placed on Sat Paul V. DelhiAdministration 9 . It is thefurtherstand of Mr. Jain, learned senior counsel that c the evidenceof thetrapwitnesses,PW-6 and PW-8 should havebeen wholly ignoredas theyare partisanwitnessesand theirstatements could not havebeengivenany credenceto inasmuchas therehas beenno corroboration. In thiscontext, he has commendedus to theauthorities in State of Bihar V. 0 Basawan Singh (CB)1°, Major E G. Barsey V. State of Bombay11, BhanupratapHariprasad Dave V State of Gujarat 12 and MO Shamshuddin V. State of Kerala. 13 16. Learnedsenior counsel would contend, solely on the basisof evidenceof recovery,a conviction is not sustainable Eand in theobtaining factual matrix,the presumptionunder Section 20 of theAct would not be attracted. To substantiate thesaidproposition,strength has beendrawnfrom C.M. Girish Babu V. C.8.1., Cochin 14 and Benarsi Oas V. State of Haryana 15". F G H 17. The last plank of submissionof Mr. Jain, is that in the instantcase, the prosecutionwas launched by Narinder Pal 9. (1976)1 sec 727. 10. (1959) SCR 195. 11. (1962) 2 SCR 195. 12. (1969)1 SCR 22. 13. (1995) 3 sec 351. 14. (2009) 3 sec 779. 15. (201 oi 4 sec 450. VINOD KUMAR v. STATE OF PUNJAB 519 [DIPAK MISRA, J.] Kaushal,PW-8, who has investigatedinto the caseand,A therefore,the conceptof fairinvestigation,has beentotally marred as a consequenceof which,the trial is vitiated.Learned seniorcounselwould contendthat a personwho is a partof thetrappartyis aninterestedwitness and he wouldbe enthusiastic to seethatthe trapis sustained in everymannerB and in sucha situation,it is per se an. unfairand biased investigationthat frustratesthe essentialprinciple inhered under Article 21 oftheConstitutionand eventuallythe trial. 18. Mr. Madhukar,learned senior counselappearingfor theStateof Punjab,per contra,would contendthat the view C expressed by the learnedtrial Judge and the High Court cannot be foundfault with,for a convictionunder the Act can be based on theevidenceof trapwitnesses,if theyare trustworthyand theingredientsof theoffenceare satisfied and in the caseat hand,the High Court on x-rayof theevidencehas so recorded.D It is urged by himthatneitherthe learned trial Judgenor the High Court hasfalleninto errorby applyingthe principleof presumption as engrafted under Section 20 oftheAct. It is canvassed by Mr. Madhukar thatthe evidenceof thehostile witnesscan be placed relianceupon by the prosecutionand E in the obtainingfactual matrix,the testimonyof PW-7,one of the shadow witnesses,renders immenseassistancefor establishingthe caseof theprosecution. He haswithgreat pains,taken us throughthe evidence to substantiatethe stand thatthe convictionrecorded against the appellant is totallyF defensible. 19. Keeping in abeyan9ewhat we intend to say on the facet ofanguishexpressed by us in the beginning, we shallproceed todealwith the proponement of Mr. Jainthat whenthe investigationconducted by Mr. Narinder Pal Kaushal, PW-8, is vitiated on the foundationthat he has lodgedthe FIR, the trial isalsovitiated.Though the saidsubmissionhas beenraised and takennote of by us as the lastplank,yet we think it seemly to dealwith it first as it goes to the rootof thematter. On a G H 520 SUPREMECOURT REPORTS [2015] 1 S.C.R. A perusal of the material on record,it is manifestthat PW-8 is a partof theraidingparty, a shadowwitness,and admittedly had also sent the complaint througha Constableto theconcerned police stationfor lodging of FIR. This beingthe factual score, wearerequiredto takenote of certainauthorities in this regard. B In Basawan Singh (supra),the Constitution.Bench, after referring to thedecision in Shiv Bahadur Singh V. State of VindhyaPradesh 16 , opinedthat the saiddecisiondoes not lay down an invariablerule that the evidenceof thewitness of the raidingparty must be discarded in the absence of any c independentcorroboration.The larger Bench proceededto statethus: D E F " ...... Thecorrect rule is this:if anyof thewitnessesare accomplices who are particepscriminis in respect of the actual crimecharged,their evidencemust be treated as theevidence of accomplices is treated;if theyare not accomplices but arepartisanor interestedwitnesses, who are concerned in the successof thetrap,their evidence mustbe tested in thesameway as otherinterested evidence is tested by the application of diverse considerationwhichmust vary fromcase to case,and in a propercase, the Courtmay even look for independent corroboratio·n· before ·donvicting theaccusedperson. If a Magistrateputs himself in the positionof a partisanor interestedwitness, he cannot claim any higherstatus and must be treatedas anyotherinterestedwitness." 20. In Major E.G. Barsey (supra), while dealing with the evidenceof a trapwitness,the courtopinedthat thougha trap witness is not an approver, he is certainly an interestedwitness G in thesensethat he is interestedto seethatthe trap laid by himsucceeds.The Court furtherlaid downthat he can at least be equatedwith a partisanwitness and it would not be admissible to rely uponhis evidencewithout corroboration,but hisevidence is nota taintedone. H 16. AIR 1954 SC 322. VINOD KUMAR v. STATE OF PUNJAB 521 [DIPAKMISRA, J.] 21. In BhanupratapHariprasad Dave (supra), the CourtA observedthat the police witnessescan be saidto bepartisan witnessesas theyare interested in the success of the trap laid by them,but it cannotbe saidthat theyare accomplices. Thereafter,the Courtproceeded to state that theirevidence must be tested in thesameway as anyotherinterestedwitnessB istestedand in an appropriatecase, the Courtmay look for independentcorroborationbefore convictingthe accused person.The three-JudgeBench reiteratedthe principle thus: " .... It is now well settled by a seriesof decisions of this C Courtthat while in the caseof evidenceof an accomplice, noconvictioncan be based on hisevidence unless it is corroboratedin material particulars but as regardsthe evidence of apartisanwitness it isopento a courtto convict an accusedperson solely on the basis of that evidence, If itissatisfiedthat that evidenceis reliable. But D itmay in appropriatecase look for corroboration". 22. In MO Shamshuddin (supra),the Court,after referring to the decisions in OPP V. Hester 17 and OPP V. Kilbourne 18 , madea distinctionbetween accomplice and an interested witness.The Court,referred to the authority in Basawan Singh (supra)at length and eventually adverted to the concept of corroboratingevidence. In that contextit hasbeenruled thus: " ....... Nowcoming to the natureof corroboratingevidence thatis required,it is well-settled that the corroborating evidence can be evenby wayof circumstantial evidence. No general rule can be laid downwith respectto quantumE F of evidence corroboratingthe testimonyof a trapwitness whichagain would depend upon its own facts and circumstances like thenature of the crime,the characterG of trap witness etc. andother general requirements 17. (1972)3 All ER 1056. 18. (1973)1 All ER 440. H 52-2 SUPREME COURT REPORTS[2015] 1 S.C.R. Aoecessarvto sustainthe conviction in thatcase.The court should weigh the evidence and then see whether corroboration is necessary.Therefore as a rule of law it cannot be laid downthat the evidenceof every complainant in a briberycase should be corroborated in all material B particulars and otherwiseit cannot be actedupon.Whether eorroboration is necessaryand if so to whatextentand wh-at should be its naturedependsupon the factsand circumstancesof eachcase. In a caseof bribe,the person whopaysthe bribeand thosewho act as intermediaries c are the only persons who can ordinarily be expected to giveevidenceabout thebribe and it is not possible to get absolutely independentevidence about the paymentof bribe." From the aforesaidauthoritiesit is clear that a trapwitness D is an interestedwitness and his testimony,to be accepted and relied upon requirescorroborationand the corroboration would dependupon the factsand circumstances,nature of thecrime andthe characterof thetrapwitness. E23. There is no doubt thatthe statusof PW8 is that of an interestedwitness. There is no cavil over the factthat he had sentthe FIR and conductedthe investigation,but thequestion posedis whetherthe investigation by him is vitiated. In this context we may,with profit,refer to the decision in Bhagwan F Singh V. State of Rajasthan 19 , whereone Ram Singh,who was aHead Constable, wasthe person to whomthe offerof bribe was alleged tohavebeenmadeby the appellant thereinand he was the informantwho had lodged the First Information Reportfor takingactionagainstthe appellant. He himselfhad Gundertakenthe investigation. In that factual backdropthe Court ruled thus: "Now, ordinarily this Court does not interfere with concurrentfindings of fact reached by the trialcourtand H 19. (1976)1 sec 1s. VINOD KUMAR v. STATE OF PUNJAB523 . [DIPAKMISRA, J.] theHigh Court on an appreciationof theevidence.But this isoneof thoserare and exceptional caseswherewe find that several importantcircumstanceshave not beentaken intoaccountby the trial courtand the High Court andthat has resulted in seriousmiscarriage of justice calling for interferencefrom this Court.We mayfirst refer to a rather disturbingfeature of thiscase. It is indeedsuch an unusual featurethat it isquitesurprisingthat it should have escapedthe noticeof the trial courtand the HighCourt. Head Constable Ram Singh wasthe personto whomthe offerof bribewas alleged to havebeenmadeby the appellant and he wasthe informantor complainant who lodged the first informationreport for takingaction against theappellant. It is difficult to understandhow in these circumstances Head Constable Ram Singh could undertake investigation of the case.How could the complainanthimself be the investigator? In fact,Head Constable Ram Singh, being an officer below the rankof DeputySuperintendentof Police, was not authorised to investigatethe casebut we do notattachany importance tothatfact, as thatmaynot affectthe validity of the conviction.The infirmitywhich we arepointingout is not an infirmityarising from investigationby an officer not authorised to doso, but an infirmity arising from investigation by a Head Constable whowas himself the personto whomthe bribewas alleged to have been offeredand who lodged the firstinformationreport as informantor complainant. This is an infirmitywhich is bound to reflect on the credibility oftheprosecution case". 24. In Megha Singh V. State of Haryana 20 , the Court noticedthe discrepancy in the depositionsof PW-2 and PW-3 andabsenceof independentcorroboration. Be it noted,the Court was dealing with an offenceunder Section 6(1) of the 20. (1996) 11 sec 709. A B c D E F G H 524 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2015] 1 S.C.R. ATerroristand DisruptiveActivities (Prevention)Act, 1985. In that context the Courtobservedthat the testimony of the said witnessesdid not inspireconfidenceabout the reliability of the prosecution'scase. Proceedingfurther, the Courtheld: B c D " .... We have also notedanotherdisturbingfeature in this case. PW 3, SiriChand,Head Constable arrestedthe accusedand on searchbeing conductedby hima pistol and the cartridgeswere recoveredfrom the accused. It was onhis complaint a formalfirst informationreport was lodged and the casewas initiated.He beingcomplainant shouldnot haveproceededwith the investigation of the case. But it appears to us that he was not only the complainant in the case but he carried onwith the investigationand examinedwitnessesunder Section 161 CrPC.Such practice,to saythe least,shouldnot be resortedto sothatthere may not be any occasionto suspectfair andimpartialinvestigation". 25. In this regard,it is useful toreferto thepronouncement in State vs. V. Jayapauf2 1 whereinthe Courtposedthe question Ewhetherthe HighCourtwas justified in quashingthe criminal proceedingson thegroundthat the policeofficer,who had lodged/recordedthe FIR regarding the suspectedcommission ofcertaincognizableoffence by therespondentshould not have investigatedthe case.The caseagainstthe accusedwas that Fhe was indulging in corruptpracticesby extractingmoney from thedriversand owners of the motor-vehicleswhile conducting checkof thevehiclesand makinguse of certain bogus notice forms in the process. The charge-sheet was filed under Sections 420 and 201 l.P.C. and Section13(2) read with GSection13(1 ){d) of the Act.TheCourtreferredto thedecision in the State of UP. V. BhagwantKishore JoshP 2 , whereinit hasbeen ruled thus: 21. (2004) 5 sec 223. 22. AIR 1964 SC 221. H VINOD KUMAR v. STATE OF PUNJAB 525 [DIPAK MISRA, J.] "Section 154 of the Code prescribes the mode of A recordingthe informationreceived orally or in writing by an officer in chargeof a police station in respectof the commissionof a cognisable offence.Section 156 thereof authorisessuch an officer to investigateany cognisable offence prescribedtherein. Though ordinarily investigationB is undertaken on information received by a police officer, thereceiptof information is nota conditionprecedentfor investigation.Section 157 prescribesthe procedure in the matter of such an investigationwhich can be initiated either on informationor otherwise. It is clear fromthe said c provisionsthat an officer in charge of a police stationcan startinvestigation eit.her on informationor otherwise." 26. Afterreproducingthe saidparagraph,the Court proceeded to statethus: "Though there is no suchstatutorybar, the premise on whichthe High Court quashedthe proceedingswas that theinvestigation by the sameofficerwho "lodged" the FIR would prejudicethe accusedinasmuch as the investigating officercannot be expected to act fairly and objectively. We find no principle orbindingauthorityto hold that the momentthe competent police officer, on the basis of informationreceived, makes out an FIR incorporatinghis name as theinformant, he forfeitshis right to investigate. If at all, suchinvestigation couldonly be assailed on the groundof biasor real likelihood of bias on thn partof the investigatingofficer. The questionof bias would depend on the facts and circumstancesof eachcase and it is not proper to lay downa broadand unqualified proposition, in the manner in which it has been done by the High Court, thatwhenevera police officer proceeds to investigateafter registeringthe FIR on his own,the investigation would necessarily be unfairor biased. In thepresentcase, the police officerreceivedcertain discreetinformation,which, accordingto hisassessment,warranted a probeand D E F G H 526 SUPREME COURT REPORTS(2015] 1 S.C.R. Athereforemade up his mindto investigate.The formality of preparing the FIR in which he records the factumof havingreceivedthe informationabout the suspected commission of the offence andthentakingup the investigationafter registeringthe crime,does not, by any B semblance ofreasoning,vitiate the investigation on the ground of biasor the like factor. If thereasonwhich weighedwith the HighCourt could be a ground to quash theprosecution,the powersof investigationconferred on the police officers would be unduly hampered for no good c reason. What is expected to be done by the police officers in the normal course of dischargeof their official duties will then be vulnerable to attack." D Beit noted,the Courtdistinguishedthe decisions in BhagwantKishore Joshi (supra) and Megha Singh (supra). 27. At this juncture, it would be fruitful to refer to S.Jeevanatham V. State (throughInspector of Police, T.N.} 23 . In thesaidcase,the appellant was found guilty underSection 8(c)readwith Section 20(b)(ii) of the NarcoticDrugs and EPsychotropicSubstances Act, 1985. One of thecontentionsthat wascanvassed was that PW-8,who lodged the FIR had himself conductedthe investigationand hence,the entireinvestigation wasvitiated.The Courtreferredto thedecision in Jayapaul (supra)and opinedthus: F G "In the instantcase, PW 8 conductedthe searchand recoveredthe contraband article andregisteredthe case andthe article seizedfrom the appellantswas narcotic drug and the counsel fortheappellants could not pointout anycircumstancesby whichthe investigationcaused prejudiceor wasbiasedagainstthe appellants.PW 8 in his official capacitygave the information,registered the caseand as part of his official duty later investigatedthe caseand filed a charge-sheet.He wasnot in any way H 23. (2004) s sec 230. VINOD KUMAR v. STATE OF PUNJAB 527 [DIPAKMISRA, J.] personallyinterested in the case. We are unable to findA anysort of bias in the process of investigation." B 28. In theinstant case,PW-8, who was a member of the raidingparty had sentthe reportto the police stationand thereaftercarried the formal investigation. In fact, nothinghas beenput to himto elicit that he wasanywaypersonally interestedto gettheappellantconvicted. In our considered view, the decision in S. Jeevanatham (supra) would be squarelyapplicable to thepresentcase and, accordingly, withoutany reservationwe repel the submissionso assiduouslyC urged by Mr. Jain, learned senior counsel for theappellant. 29.Thenextaspectwhich requiresto be advertedto is whethertestimony of a hostileevidencethat has comeon record should be relied uponor not.Mr. Jain, learnedsenior counsel for theappellantwould contendthat as PW-7has totally resiled in hiscross-examination,his evidence is to be discarded in toto. On a perusal of thetestimonyof thesaid witness,it is evincible that in examination-in-chief, he has supportedthe prosecutionstory in entirety and in the cross­ examination he hastakenthepathof prevarication. In Bhagwan Singh V. State of Haryana 24, it hasbeen laid downthat evenif awitness is characterisedhas a hostile witness,his evidence is not completely effaced. The said evidence remains admissible in the trial andthereis nolegalbar to basea convictionupon his testimony,if corroboratedby other reliable evidence. In Khuji @ SurendraTiwari V. State of Madhya Pradesh 25 , the Court after referring to theauthoritiesin Bhagwan Singh (supra), Rabindra Kumar Dey V. State of Orissa 26 and Syad Akbar V. State of Karnataka 27, opined that theevidence of sucha witnesscannot be effacedor washed 24. (1976)1 sec 389. 2s.(1991)3 sec 627. 26. (1976) 4 sec 233. 21. (1980)1 sec 30. D E F G H 528 SUPREME COURT REPORTS[2015] 1 S.C.R. A off the record altogether, but thesamecan be acceptedto the extentit isfound to be dependable on a careful scrutiny thereof. 30. In thiscontext,we thinkit aptto reproducesome passagesfrom Rammi @ Rameshwar V. State of Madhya B Pradesh 28 , wherethe Court was dealing with the purpose of re­ examination.After referringto Section138 of the EvidenceAct, the Courtheld thus: c D E F "There is anerroneousimpressionthat re-examination should be confinedto clarification of ambiguitieswhich havebeenbroughtdown in cross-examination. No doubt, ambiguitiescan be resolved throughre-examination.But thatis notthe only function of there-examiner. If the party who called thewitness feels that explanation is required foranymatterreferredto in cross-examination he has the liberty to put anyquestion in re-examination to get the explanation. The PublicProsecutorshould formulate his questionsfor thatpurpose. Explanation maybe required eitherwhen the ambiguityremains regardingany answer elicited duringcross-examinationor evenotherwise. If the PublicProsecutorfeels that certainanswers require more elucidation from the witnesshe hasthe freedomand the rightto putsuchquestionsas he deems necessaryfor that purpose,subject of course to the control of the court in accordancewith the otherprovisions.But thecourtcannot directhim to confinehis questions to ambiguities alone whicharose in cross-examination. Evenif the PublicProsecutorfeels that newmatters should be elicited fromthe witnesshe cando so, in whichcase the only requirementis thathe mustsecurepermissionof Gthe court. If the courtthinksthat suchnew mattersare necessaryfor provingany material fact, courtsmust be liberal in grantingpermissionto putnecessaryquestions''. H 2s. (1999) s sec 649. VINOD KUMAR v. STATE OF PUNJAB 529 [DIPAKMISRA, J.] 31.Wehavereproducedthe aforesaidparagraphsto A highlight that whenthe prosecutionhas sucha right in the processof re-examination,as a natural corollary,the testimony ofa hostile witnesscannot be brushedaside. On the contrary, boththe prosecution and the defencecan rely for theirstand andstance.Emphasis on re-examination by the prosecution is B not limited to anyanswergiven in the cross-examination,but the Public Prosecutorhas the freedomand right to put such questions as itdeemsnecessaryto elucidate certain answers fromthe witness. It is not confined to clarificationof ambiguities, whichhave beenbroughtdown in the cross-examination. c 32. Mr. Jain, learned senior counsel haspropoundedthat testimonyof PW7deservesto bediscredited,and the learned trialJudge as well as theHigh Court havingnot ignoredhave committeda graveerror. We will be dealing with the aspect whetherthe evidenceof PW-7 should be totally ignoredor notD while we will be dwelling upon the credibility and acceptability ofhistestimony. 33. As acontention has beenraisedthat once the informant has resiledtotally from his earlier statement no convictioncan be recorded on the basisof evidenceof thetrapwitnesses,it requiredto be carefullydwelled upon. In this regard,reference totheauthority in HazariLal v. State (Delhi Administration)2 9 would be apt. In the saidcasea policeConstable was convicted underSection5(2) of thePrevention of CorruptionAct, 1947 on the allegationthat he had demandedand receivedRs.60/­ fromthe informantwho was examinedas PW-3and had resiled from his previousstatementand was declaredhostile by the prosecution. Official witnesseshad supportedthe prosecution version.Keeping in mind the evidence of the official witnesses the trialCourt had convictedthe appellant therein which was affirmed by theHigh Court. A contentionwas raisedthat in the absence of any direct evidence to show thatthe police 29. (1980)2 sec 390 E F G H 530 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2015] 1 S.C.R. A constable demandedor acceptedbribery no presumptionunder Section4 of the Act,194 7 could be drawn merely on the­ strength of recovery of themarkedcurrencynotes from the said policeconstable. ChinnappaReddy, J. speakingfor thetwo- B c D E F JudgeBenchobservedas follows:- " ... lt isnotnecessarythat the passing of money should be proved by direct evidence. It may also be provedby circumstantialevidence. The eventswhich followed in quick succession in thepresentcase lead to the only inference thatthe moneywas obtainedby theaccusedfrom PW 3. Under Section 114 of the EvidenceAct the court may presumethe existence of anyfact whichit thinks likely to havehappened,regard being had to thecommoncourse of natural events, human conductand public and private business, in their relation tofacts of the particular case. One of theillustrationsto Section114 of the EvidenceAct isthatthe courtmay presumethat a· person who is in possession of the stolen goodssoon after the theft,is eitherthe thiefor hasreceivedthe goodsknowingthem tobe stolen,unless he canaccountfor hispossession. So too, in thefactsand circumstances of the presentcase the courtmay presumethat the accusedwho tookout the currencynotes from his pocketand flung them acrossthe wall had obtainedthem from PW 3, who a fewminutes earlier wasshownto havebeenin possession of the notes. Once wearriveat thefindingthat the accusedhad obtainedthe moneyfrom PW 3, the presumptionunder Section 4(1) of the Prevention of Corruption Act is immediately attracted." G 34. It is pertinentto noteherethat in the aforesaidcase thedecisionrendered in Sita Ram v. State of Rajasthan 30 was pressedinto service. In the case of Sita Ram (supra)the complainant had turned hostile in the court of Special Judge. H 30. (1975)2 sec 227. VINOD KUMAR v. STATE OF PUNJAB 531 [DIPAK MISRA, J.] However,the trial Judge convictedthe accusedwho was triedA along with anotheraccused, namely, Vikram Singh. The High court on appreciation ofthe evidence acq.uitted Vikram Singh butmaintainedthe convictionagainst Sita Ram. This Court opinedthat the presumptionunder Section4(1) of the 194 7 Act could not be drawn in thefactsof thecase.The question,B whetherthe restof theevidencewas sufficient to establish that the accusedhad obtainedthe moneyfrom the complaint was notconsidered.The Court in HazariLal (supra)distinguished thepronouncement in SitaRam (supra) by statingthus:- " ... The questionwhether the restof theevidencewas C sufficient to establish that the accused had obtainedthe moneyfrom the complainant was not considered. All that wastaken as established wasthe recoveryof certain moneyfrom the personof theaccused and it was held that mererecoveryof moneywas not enough to entitle the drawing of thepresumptionunder Section4(1) of the Preventionof CorruptionAct. The Court did not consider D the furtherquestionwhether recoveryof themoney along withothercircumstances couldestablish that the accused hadobtainedgratificationfrom any person. In the presentE casewe havefoundthat the circumstances established by theprosecution entitled thecourt to hold thatthe accused receivedthe gratificationfrom PW 3. In SurajMal v. State (Delhi Admn.) 31, also itwassaidmererecoveryof money divorcedfrom the circumstancesunder whichit waspaidF wasnot sufficientwhen the substantiveevidence in the casewas not reliable to provepaymentof bribe or to show that the accused voluntarily accepted the money. There can be no quarrel withthat propositionbut wherethe recovery of themoney coupled withothercircumstances leads to G the conclusion thatthe accusedreceived gratificationfrom somepersonthe court wouldcertainly be entitled to draw thepresumptionunder Section4(1) of thePrevention of 31. (1979)4 sec 725. H 532 SUPREME COURT REPORTS[2015] 1 S.C.R. A CorruptionAct. In our viewboth the decisionsare of no avail to the appellant andas already observedby us conclusions of factmust be drawn on the factsof each caseand not on the factsof other cases." B 35. In thiscontextit would be germane to understandwhat hasbeenstated in M. NarsingaRao v. State of A.P3 2 . In the saidcase, allegations againstthe accused- appellant werethat one SatyaPrasad, PW1 thereinwas to getsomeamountfrom Andhra Pradesh Dairy Development CooperativeFederation for transporting milk to or fromthe milk chilling centreat CLuxettipet (Adilabad District).He hadapproachedthe appellant for takingsteps to enable him to getmoneydisbursed.The appellant demanded Rs.5000/- for sending the recommendation in favour of paymentof theamountdue to PW1. As the appellant persistedwith his demand PW1 yielded Dto thesame.But beforehandingover the moneyto him he lodged a complaint with DSP of Anti-CorruptionBureau. On the basisof thesaid complaintall arrangementswere ma<;ie for a trapto catchthe corrupt public servantred-handed.Thereafter the Court advertedhow the trap had taken place. Thecourttook Enoteof thefactthat PW1 and PW2 madea volteface in the trial court and deniedhaving paid any briberyto the appellant and also deniedthat the appellant demandedthe bribeamount.The stand of theaccusedbefore the trial court under Section 313 of CrPC was that one Dr. KrishnaRao boregrudgeand had F orchestrateda false trap againsthim by employing PW1 and PW2. Be it stated, in hisdeposition PW1 had statedthat he had acted on the behest of one Dr. KrishnaRao. It was further thestandof theaccused-appellantthat the taintedcurrency noteswere forcibly stuffedinto his pocket.The trial court and GtheHighCourt had disbelieved the defenceevidence and found that PW1 and PW2 werewon over by the appellant and that is whytheyturned hostile againsttheir own versionrecorded by the investigatingofficer and subsequently by a Magistrateunder H 32. (2001)1 sec 691. VINOD KUMAR v. STATE OF PUNJAB 533 [DIPAKMISRA, J.] Section 164 of CrPC. The Special Judge ordered the witnessesto beprosecutedfor perjuryand the saidcourse suggested by thetrialJudgefound approval of the HighCourt also.Whiledealingwith the controversythiscourt took note of the factthatthe HighCourthad observedthat thoughthere was no direct evidenceto showthat the accusedhad demanded andacceptedthe money,yet therest of the evidenceand the circumstanceswere sufficientto establishthat the accusedhad acceptedthe amount and thatgaverise to a presumptionunder Section 20 of the Prevention of CorruptionAct thathe accepted A B c the same asillegalgratification,particularly so, whenthe defencetheory put forthwas not accepted. It wascontended beforethis courtthat presumptionunder Section 20 of the Act canbe drawn only when the prosecution succeeded in establishingwith directevidencethat the delinquentpublic servanthad acceptedor obtainedgratification. It was further 0 urgedthat it wasnot enoughthat somecurrencynotes were handed over tothepubicservantto makeit acceptance of gratificationand it wasincumbent on the partof theprosecution tofurtherprove that whatwas paidamountedto gratification. In support of thesaidcontentionreliance was placed on Sita Ram (supra)and Sura) Mal v. State (Delhi Admn.} 33 . The three-JudgeBench referredto Section 20(1) of the Act,the pronouncements in Hawkins v. Powells TillerySteam Coal Co. Ltd3 4 and Suresh BudharmalKalani v. State of Maharashtra 35 and advertedto thefactsand cameto hold as follows:- "From thoseprovedfacts the courtcan legitimately draw E F apresumptionthat the appellantreceived or accepted the saidcurrencynotes on his ownvolition. Of course,the said presumptionis notan inviolable one,as theappellant could rebutit eitherthroughcross-examination of the witnessesG citedagainsthim or by adducing reliable evidence.But if the appellant fails to disprovethe presumptionthe same 33.(1979)4 sec 725. 34.(1911)1 KB 988: 1911 WN 53. 35. (1998) 7SCC 337. H 534 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2015] 1 S.C.R. A would stick and thenit canbe held by thecourtthat the prosecutionhas provedthat the appellant receivedthe said amount." 36. It isaptto noteherethe three-JudgeBench referred 8 to theobservations in HazariLal (supra)and opinedthus:- "The aforesaidobservationis in consonancewith the line of approachwhich we haveadoptednow. We maysay with greatrespectto the learned Judges of thetwo-Judge Benchthat the legalprinciple on thisaspecthas been Ccorrectly propoundedtherein." 37. In thisregardMr. Jainhas placedreliance on the authority B. Jayaraj (supra). In thesaidcasethe complainant did notsupportthe prosecutionversion and had stated in his 0 depositionthat the amountthat waspaidby him to theaccused waswith a requestthat it maybe deposited in thebankas fee forrenewalof hislicencefor thefairpriceshop.The court referredto Section7 of the Actandobserved as follows:- E F G H "Insofar as theoffenceunder Section 7 is concerned,it is asettledposition in law thatdemandof illegalgratification is sine qua non to constitutethe saidoffenceand mere recovery of currencynotes cannotconstitutethe offence underSection7 unless it isprovedbeyond all reasonable doubtthat the accusedvoluntarilyaccepted the money knowingit tobea bribe.The abovepositionhas been succinctlylaid down in severaljudgmentof thisCourt.By way of illustration referencemay be madeto thedecision in C.M. Sharma v. State of A.P 36 . and C.M. GirishBabu V. C.B./.37" After so observing,the courtproceededto statethus:­ "ln the presentcase, the complainantdid not supportthe 36. (2010) 15 sec 1. 37. (2009) 3 sec 779. VINOD KUMAR v. STATE OF PUNJAB 535 [DIPAKMISRA, J.] prosecutioncase insofaras demandby theaccusedis concerned. The prosecutionhas not examinedany other witness,present at thetimewhenthe money was allegedly handedover to theaccusedby thecomplainant,to prove thatthe samewas pursuantto anydemandmade by the accused. When the complainant himself hasdisowned whathe hadstatedin the initialcomplaint (exbt.P-11) beforeLW-9, and thereis nootherevidenceto provethat theaccusedhad madeany demand,the evidence of PW- 1 andcontentsof Exbt. P-11 cannotbe relied upon to come A B tothe conclusion thatthe above material furnishesproof c of the demand allegedly madeby theaccused. We are, therefore, inclined to hold thatthe Ld. Trial courtas well as theHigh Court wasnot correctin holding the demand alleged to bemadeby theaccusedas proved.The only other material available is therecovery of the tainted currencynotes from the possession of theaccused. In fact, suchpossessionis admittedby theaccused himself. Mere possessionand recovery of the currencynotes from the accusedwithout proof of demand will not bringhomethe offenceunder Section 7. The above alsowill be conclusive insofar as the offence under Section 13(1)(d)(i)(ii)is concernedas in theabsence of anyproof of demandfor illegal gratification,the use of corruptor illegal means or abuse of position as a public servant to obtain any valuable thing of pecuniaryadvantagecannot be held to be established." 38. The said principle has been followed in M.R. Purushotham v. State of Karnataka 38. On anattentiveand cautiousreading of the aforesaiddecisionsit isnoticeablethat D E F the courtdisbelievedthe story of the prosecutionas nootherG evidencewas broughton