Representation of the People Act, 1951:

s. 123 (3) (as amended in 1961) - Interpretation of - Held: Majority View: The Act being a statute that enables to cherish and strengthen democratic ideals should be interpreted in a manner that assists the elector or 1he electorate and not that assists the candidates - Keeping in view the social context in which sub-section (3) of s.123 was enacted and today's social and technological context, ii is absolutely necessary to give a broad and purposive interpretation rather than a literal or strict interpretation - The provisions under sub-section (3) are required to be read and appreciated in the context of simultaneous and contemporaneous amendments inserting sub-section (3A) in s. 123 and inserting s. 153A in IPC - Therefore sub-section (3) of s. 123 is to be interpreted in such a way so as to bring within sweep of 'corrupt practice', any appeal on the ground of the religion, race, caste, community or language of (i) any candidate or (ii) his agent, or (iii) any other person making appeal with the consent of the candidate, or (iv) the elector - The bar uls. 123 (3) to making an appeal on the ground of religion must not be confined to the religion of the candidate or that of his rival candidates - The word 'his' occurring in the Section refers not only lo the candidate or his agent, but is also intended to refer to the vol er or elector - Determination of the facts whether an appeal, at all, has been made to the elector and whether appeal made, is in violation of s. 123(3), would be a matter of evidence - Minority view: Election petitions alleging corrupt practices have a quasi-criminal character wherein standard of proof is close to that which guides a criminal trial - Therefore, s.123(3) must be interpreted in literal sense - The expression 'his' in s. 123(3) used in conjunction with religion, race, caste, community or language is in reference to the religion, race, caste, community or language of the candidate (in whose favour the appeal to caste a vote is made) or that of a rival candidate (when an appeal is made to refrain from voting for another) - Sub-section (3) cannot be construed as referring to the religion, race, caste, community or language of the voter, even if the provision is given a purposive interpretation - Discussion, debate or dialogue, of matters relating to religion, race, caste, community or language of the voters is not an appeal on those grounds, and the same is protected being an intrinsic part of freedom of speech.

s.123(3) - Long-standing interpretation of given by the courts - Unsettling of - Permissibility - Held: Per Madan B. Lokur, J.: The interpretation given to s.123(3) was not well recognized ani there was uncertainty about correct interpretation thereof the court can unsettle the long-standing interpretation - Per: Dr. D. Y. Chandrachud, J.: A change in the legal position, which has held  the field through judicial precedent over a length of time can be considered only in exceptional and compelling circumstances - In the present cases no case has been made out to take a view at variance with the settled legal position that the expression 'his' in s. 123 (3) must mean the religion, race, community or language of the candidate - Precedent.

Interpretation of Statutes:

Literal interpretation vis-a-vis purposive interpretation - Per Madan B. Lokur, J.: While interpreting a statute or a provision in a statute, not only the text of the law; but also the context in which it was enacted and the social context, should be considered - However, in statutes having penal consequence, affecting liberty of an individual or imposing financial burden on a person, the rule of literal interpretation would still hold good - Per T. S. Thakur, C.J.I.: While interpreting an enactment, the courts should remain cognizant of constitutional goals and the purpose of the Act and interpret the provisions accordingly - Per S. A. Bobde, J.: A literal interpretation does not exclude a purposive interpretation - While construing a statute both the rules of interpretation can be applied whether it be penal statute or taxing statute - Per Dr. D.Y. Chandrachud, J.: Where a statutory provision implicates penal consequences or consequences of a quasi-criminal character, a strict construction of the words used by the legislature must be adopted.

Rule of Interpretation Per T. S. Thakur, C.J.I.: An interpretation which has the effect of eroding or diluting the constitutional objective of keeping the State and its activities free from religious considerations, must be avoided - The interpretations that are in tune with constitutional provisions and ethos ought to be preferred over others.

Rule of interpretation - Per S.A. Bobde, .J.: While interpreting statutes, wherever the language is clear, the intention of the c legislature must bi! ga1hered from the language used, and the support from extraneous sources should be avoided.

Statutory interpretation - Use of legislative history as an aid to statutory interpretation - Permissibility - Held: Per Dr. D.Y. Chandrachud, J.: Legislative history is a significant element in the formation of an informed interpretation.