Constitution of India, Art. 143(1) – Reference under, whether must relate to matters pertaining to the President's powers and duties under the Constitution – Refusal to answer when justifiable.

Constitution of India, Art. 194(3) – Privileges of the House of Commons conferred on Indian State Legislatures – Power to commit for contempt by conclusive general warrant, whether one of such privileges – Privileges whether subject to provisions of the Constitution and to fundamental rights – Power to determine scope of privileges, whether rests entirely with legislatures to the exclusion of the Courts.

Constitution of India, Arts. 32, 226 – Power of Supreme Court and High Courts to entertain petitions challenging the legality of committals for contempt by State Legislatures – Power to interfere where breach of fundamental rights alleged.

Constitution of India, Art. 211 – Whether directory or mandatory – Its impact on Art. 194(3).

The Legislative Assembly of the State of Uttar Pradesh committed one Keshav Singh, who was not a member of the Assembly, to prison for contempt. The warrant of committal did not contain the facts constituting the alleged contempt. While undergoing imprisonment for the committal, Keshav Singh, through his advocate, moved a petition under Article 226 of the Constitution and Section 491 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, challenging his committal as being in breach of his fundamental rights; he also prayed for interim bail. The High Court (Lucknow Bench) gave notice to the Government Counsel, who accepted it on behalf of all the respondents, including the Legislative Assembly. At the time fixed for the hearing of the bail application, the Government Counsel did not appear. Beg and Saghal, JJ., who heard the application, ordered that Keshav Singh be released on bail pending the decision of his petition under Article 226.

The Legislative Assembly found that Keshav Singh and his advocate, in moving the High Court, and the two judges of the High Court, in entertaining the petition and granting bail, had committed contempt of the Assembly. It passed a resolution that all of them be produced before it in custody. The judges and the advocate then filed writ petitions before the High Court at Allahabad, and a Full Bench of the High Court admitted their petitions and ordered a stay of the execution of the Assembly's resolution against them. The Assembly subsequently passed a clarificatory resolution that modified its earlier stance. Instead of being produced in custody, the judges and the advocate were asked to appear before the House and offer their explanations.

At this stage, the President of India made a reference under Article 143(1) of the Constitution, in which the whole dispute regarding the constitutional relationship between the High Court and the State Legislature, including the question of whether Keshav Singh, his advocate, and the two judges were guilty of contempt of the State Legislature, was referred to the Supreme Court for its opinion and report.

During the hearing of the reference, a preliminary objection regarding its competency was raised on behalf of the Advocate General of Bihar, on the grounds that it did not relate to any matters covered by the President's powers and duties under the Constitution. It was also urged that even if the reference were competent, the Court should not answer it, as it was not obliged to do so and that the answers provided would not assist the President in resolving any difficulties he might face in discharging his duties. The Court did not accept these contentions and proceeded to hear the parties, which broadly fell into two groups: those supporting the Assembly and those supporting the High Court.

On behalf of the Assembly, it was argued that by virtue of Article 194(3) of the Constitution, all the powers, privileges, and immunities of the House of Commons of the United Kingdom had been conferred on it. It claimed to be the sole judge of its privileges and that the Courts had no jurisdiction to interfere with their exercise. In the alternative, it was contended that Courts in England never interfered with a committal by the House of Commons for contempt when the committal was by a general warrant, i.e., a warrant that did not state the facts constituting the contempt; therefore, Courts in India were also precluded from examining the legality of the general warrants of the State Legislatures. The proceedings in the High Court in this case were thus deemed contemptuous of the legislature.

Those supporting the position taken by the High Court contended that the Legislatures received the powers of the House of Commons subject to the provisions of the Constitution and fundamental rights. They argued that the power to commit by general warrant was not one of the privileges of the House of Commons, that by virtue of Articles 226 and 32, citizens had the right to move the Courts when their fundamental rights were contravened, and that because of the provisions in Article 211, the Legislature was precluded from taking any action against the Judges.