Karnataka Land Reforms Act, 1961 - ss.110 and 140 - Exemption provisions - Exemption under s.107 for lands used for cultivation of Linaloe - Power to withdraw the exemption uls. 110 - Constitutional validity of s.110 - Withdrawal of exemption vide notification dated 08.03.1994 issued under s.110 - Notification in question not laid before the Legislature - Validity of the Notification - Held: Power to withdraw exemption has not been conferred on the State Government, but evidently retained by the Legislature - The Legislature's apathy in granting is discernible from the language used in sub-section (2) of s.107, which says that no person shall after the commencement of the Amendment Act acquire in any manner for the cultivation of Linaloe, land of an extent which together with the land cultivated by Linaloe, if any, already held by him exceeds ten units - Legislature, therefore, as matter of policy, wanted to give only a conditional exemption for lands used for Linaloe cultivation and the policy was to empower the State Government to withdraw the same especially when the law is that no person can claim exemption as a matter of right - The legislative will was to make s.107 subject to s.110 and not the will of the delegate, hence, overriding effect has to be given to s.110 - The contention that s.110 is void due to excessive delegation of legislative powers, is not acceptable - Further, the Act including s.110 was placed in IXth Schedule in the year 1965 and, hence immune from challenge in a court of law - Land used for linaloe cultivation would be governed by the provisions of the Act which is protected under Article 31B of the Constitution having been included in the IXth Schedule - The appellant-company could not have held the land used for the cultivation of Linaloe on the date of the commencement of the Act - Further on withdrawal of exemption vide notification dated 08.03.94 the appellant-company became disentitled to hold the land - Non-laying of the notification dt. 8.3.94 under s.140 of the Act before the State Legislature was a curable defect and did not affect the validity of the notification or action taken thereunder - No force in the contention that opportunity of hearing is a precondition for exercising powers under s.110 of the Act - No such requirement has been provided under s.107 or s.110 - Constitution of India, 1950 - Article 318 - Administrative Law - Delegated legislation.

The Roerich and Devika Rani Roerich Estate (Acquisition & Transfer) Act, 1996 - Constitutional validity of - Plea of repugnancy between the provisions of the Land Acquisition Act, 1894 and the Roerich and Devika Rani Roerich Estate (Acquisition & Transfer) Act - Tenability of - Held: Plea is not acceptable - Under Article 254 of the Constitution, a State law passed in respect of a subject matter comprised in List Ill would be invalid if its provisions are repugnant to a law passed on the same subject by Parliament and that too only if both the laws cannot exist together - If the dominant intention of two legislations is different, they cover different subject matter then merely because the two legislations refer to some allied or cognate subjects, they do not cover the same field - The Roerich and Devika Rani Roerich Estate (Acquisition & Transfer) Act, 1996, primarily falls under Entry 18 List II, since the dominant intention of the legislature was to preserve and protect Roerichs' Estate covered by the provisions of the Karnataka Land Reforms Act, on the State Government withdrawing the exemption in respect of the land used for linaloe cultivation - The said Acquisition Act, though primarily falls under Entry 18 List II incidentally also deals with the acquisition of paintings, artefacts and other valuable belongings of Roerichs' and, hence, the Act partly falls under Entry 42 List Ill as well - Since the dominant purpose of the Act was to preserve and protect Roerichs' Estate as part of agrarian reforms, the inclusion of ancillary measures would not throw the Jaw out of the protection of Article 31A(1)(a) - On the other hand, the Land Acquisition Act, 1894 is an Act which fell exclusively under Entry 42 List Ill and enacted for the purpose of acquisition of land needed for public purposes for companies and for determining the amount of compensation to be made on account of such acquisition, which is substantially and materially different from the Acquisition Act whose dominant purpose is to preserve and protect "estate" governed by Art.31A(a) read with Art.31A(2)(a)(iii) of the Constitution - Therefore, no assent of the President was required under Article 254(2) of the Constitution to sustain the impugned Acquisition Act, which falls under Article 31 A(1)(a) of the Constitution - Constitution of India, 1950 - Articles 31A and 254(2) - Land Acquisition Act, 1894.

Constitution of India, 1950 - Art. 300A - Exercise of the power of eminent domain - Scope - Held: Article 300A proclaims that no person can be deprived of his property save by authority of Jaw, meaning thereby that a person cannot be deprived of his property merely by an executive fiat, without any specific legal authority or without the support of Jaw made by a competent legislature - Principles of eminent domain, as such, is not seen incorporated in Article 300A - Doctrines - Doctrine of Eminent Domain.

 Constitution of India, 1950 - Art.300A - Requirement of, public purpose for depriving a person of his property - Payment of compensation to a person who is deprived of his property - Held: Deprivation of property within the meaning of Art. 300A, generally speaking, must take place for public purpose or public interest - Any law, which deprives a person of his private property for private interest. will be unlawful and unfair and undermines the rule of law and can be subjected to judicial review - Public purpose is a precondition for deprivation of a person from his property under Article. 300A and the right to claim compensation is also inbuilt in that Article and when a person is deprived of his property the State has to justify both the grounds which may depend on scheme of the statute, legislative policy, object and purpose of the legislature and other related factors - Article 300A does not prohibit the payment of just compensation when a person is deprived of his property - Requirement of public purpose, for deprivation of a person of his property under Article 300A, is a pre-condition, but no compensation or nil compensation or its illusiveness has to be justified by the State on judicially justiciable standards.

Interpretation of Statute - Statute depriving a person of his property - Scope for judicial review - Held: Statutes are many which though deprives a person of his properly, have the protection of Article 30(1A), Article 31A, 31B, 31C and hence immune from challenge under Article 19 or Article 14 - On deletion of Article 19(1)(f), the available grounds of challenge are Article 14, the basic structure and the rule of law, apart from the ground of legislative competence - Through the Impugned Act was not included in the IXth Schedule but since the Act was protected by Article 31A, it was immune from challenge on the ground of violation of Article 14 - Constitution of India, 1950 - Articles 14 and 31A - The Roerich and Devika Rani Roerich Estate (Acquisition & Transfer) Act, 1996.

Rule of law - Held: Rule of law as a concept finds no place in Indian Constitution, but has been characterized as a basic feature of Indian Constitution which cannot be abrogated or destroyed even by the Parliament and in fact binds the Parliament - Rule of law as an overarching principle can be applied by the constitutional courts in rarest of rare cases, and can undo laws which are tyrannical, violate the basic structure of the Indian Constitution, and the cherished norms of law and justice.

Dr. Svetoslav Roerich, a Russia born internationally acclaimed painter and artist, and his wife Mrs. Devika Rani Roerich owned an Estate in Bangalore covering 470.19 acres, out of which 100 acres were granted to them by the State Government of Karnataka in the year 1954 for Linaloe cultivation. When the Karnataka Land Reforms Act, 1961 came into force, they filed declarations under Section 66 of the Act before the Land Tribunal stating that they had no surplus lands to surrender to the State since the entire area held by them had been used for the cultivation of Linaloe which was exempted under Section 107(1)(vi) of the Land Reforms Act. Consequently, the Land Tribunal vide order dated 15.03.82 dropped the proceedings .instituted under the Act against them holding that the land used for cultivation of Linaloe did not attract the provisions of the Land Reforms Act.

Dr. Roerich and Mrs. Devika Rani had no issue and allegedly some persons associated with the couple, who had an eye on their properties, including the land used for linaloe cultivation, valuable paintings, jewellery, artefacts etc., began to create documents to grab those properties. The Chief Secretary of the State of Karnataka noticing the above facts and circumstances convened a meeting in the presence of the Director of Archaeology to take effective and proper steps to preserve the paintings, artefacts and other valuables. For that purpose, they met Smt. Devika Rani and Dr. Roerich and a letter was handed over to Dr. Roerich on behalf of the State Government expressing the Government's willingness to purchase the paintings and other valuables so as to set up a Roerich Gallery. The State Cabinet also discussed about the desirability of acquiring the landed properties of Roerichs and also for setting up an Art Gallery-cum-Museum, in public interest. Initially the State issued an ordinance, namely, the Roerich and Devika Rani Roerich Estate (Acquisition and Transfer) Ordinance 1992, which was sent for the approval of the President of India. In the meanwhile Roerich couple passed away and the ordinance was returned to make-sufficient amendments. After necessary amendments ordinance of 1995 was issued. The ordinance was returned by the Government of India informing that it had no objection to introduce legislation as a bill and hence the same with requisite amendments was placed before the Legislative Assembly and the Legislative Council. The Roerich and Devika Rani Roerich Estate (Acquisition & Transfer) Act, 1996 was then passed and subsequently got the assent of the President on 15.11.96 and was brought into force on 21.11.1996.

Meanwhile, the Deputy Commissioner of the District had reported that Roerichs had owned 470.19 acres of land, out of which they had raised Linaloe cultivation to the extent of 356.15 acres and the remaining extent of 114.04 acres was agricultural land; that as per the ceiling provisions of the Land Reforms Act they were entitled to hold an extent of 54 acres of agricultural land and as such, the excess of 60.04 acres ought to have been surrendered by them to the Government. The view of the Law Department was sought for in that respect and the Law Department stated that the earlier order dated 15.03.82 of the Land Tribunal be reopened and action under Section 67(1) be initiated for resumption of the excess land. The Deputy Commissioner was requested to issue suitable instructions to the Tahsildar to place the matter before the Land Tribunal, for review of the earlier order dated 15.03.82 by invoking the provisions of  Section 122A of the Land Reforms Act. The Deputy Commissioner had further reported that Dr. Roerich had sold an extent of 137.33 acres of land on 23.3.1991 to the first appellant-company 'KTP'; but request for mutation in respect of those lands had been declined by the local officers and the lands stood in the name of late Dr. Roerich in the Record of Rights.

The Commissioner and Secretary to the Government, Revenue Department taking note of the said facts sought the legal opinion of the Department of Law and Parliamentary Affairs as to whether valuable lands held by the late Roerichs could be resumed by the State before lands changed hands, by withdrawing the exemption given to the lands used for Linaloe cultivation. The Department of Law and Parliamentary Affairs opined that the exemption given under Section 107 of the Land Reforms Act, 1961 can be withdrawn by the Government by issuing a notification as per Section 110 of the Land Reforms Act and consequently the Commissioner and Secretary to the government proposed to issue a notification to that effect for which approval of the Cabinet was sought for. The Cabinet accorded sanction in its meeting and the State Government issued notification Notification No. RD 217 LRA 93 dated 8th March, 1994 in exercise of powers conferred by Section 110 of the Land Reforms Act, withdrawing the exemption granted for the lands used for cultivation of Linaloe under clause (vi) of Sub-section 1 of Section 107 of the Act. Notification was published in the Government Gazette on 11.03.1994.

The Assistant Commissioner thereafter issued a notice to the first appellant-company 'KTP' to show cause why 137.33 acres of land be not forfeited to the Government. 

The first appellant-company, through its Managing Director, filed a Writ Petition before the High Court challenging the constitutional validity of the Roerich and Devika Rani Roerich (Acquisition and Transfer) Act, 1996, Section 110 of the Karnataka Land Reforms Act, the notification dated 08.03.1994 issued thereunder and also sought other consequential reliefs. The writ petition was dismissed by the High Court upholding the validity of the Acquisition Act as well as Section 110 of the Land Reforms Act and the notification issued thereunder except in relation to the inclusion of certain members in the Board of Directors constituted under the Acquisition Act.

Aggrieved, the first appellant-company inter alia raised the following contentions before this Court under three major heads:-

(a) Legal validity of Section 110 of the Karnataka Land Reforms Act, 1961, the Notification No. RD 217 LRA 93 dated 8th March, 1994 issued by the State Government thereunder:

It was contended that the first appellant-Company had purchased the lands from Roerich couple when those lands stood exempted from the provisions of the Land Reforms Act by virtue of Section 107(1)(vi) of the Land Reforms Act; that the State Government could not, in exercise of its powers under Section 110 of the Act, issue notification dated 08.03.94 to withdraw the exemption granted by the Legislature which was essentially a legislative policy; that Section 110 gives unfettered and unguided power to the Executive to take away the exemption granted by the Legislature and hence that Section is void for excessive delegation of legislative powers on the State Government; that the respondent State did not follow the procedure laid down in Section 140 of the Act; that laying of notification under Section 140 is not a mere laying but is coupled with a negative/affirmative resolution of the Legislature; the failure to lay the notification is an illegality which cannot be cured; that though the Land Reforms Act was placed in the 9th Schedule which saves its provisions from the challenge of Articles 14, 19 and 31, a challenge to a provision of the Act for excessive delegation of legislative power is still available and the Land Reforms Act cannot be protected by Article 31B.

 (b) Constitutional validity of Roerich and Devika Rani Roerich Estate (Acquisition & Transfer) Act, 1996:

 It was contended that the Roerich and Devika Rani Roerich Estate (Acquisition & Transfer) Act, 1996 does not contain any provision for protection of agrarian reforms and hence not protected by the provisions of Article 31A and hence not saved from challenges on the ground of violation of Articles 14 and 19 of the Constitution; that management and protection of land used for linaloe cultivation and the preservation of artefacts, paintings etc. are not part of agrarian reforms; that the said Act, a State Legislation, is ex-facie repugnant to the provisions of Land Acquisition Act, 1894, a Central Legislation and hence void under Article 254(1) due to want of Presidential assent; and that the procedure and the principle for the acquisition of land as well as determination of compensation, etc., under both the Acts are contrary to each other and hence the said Act can be saved only if Presidential assent is obtained under Article 254(2) of the constitution.

(c) Claim for enhanced compensation and scope and content of Article 300A of the Constitution:

It was. contended that the Roerich and Devika Rani Roerich Estate (Acquisition & Transfer) Act, 1996 does not provide for any principle or guidelines for the fixation of the compensation amount and the amount fixed is illusory, compared to the value of the property taken away from the first appellant-company in exercise of the powers of eminent domain; that the inherent powers of public purpose and eminent domain are embodied in Article 300A, and Entry 42 List Ill, "Acquisition and Requisitioning of Property" which necessarily connotes that the acquisition and requisitioning of property will be for a public use and for compensation, as it is the legislative head for eminent domain; that the twin requirements of public purpose and compensation though seen omitted from Article 300A, but when a person is deprived of his property, those limitations are implied in Article 300A as well as Entry 42 List Ill and a Constitutional Court can always examine the validity of the statute on those grounds; and that the action depriving a person of just and fair compensation is also amenable to judicial review under Articles 32 and 226 of the Constitution, which is the quintessence of the rule of law, otherwise the Constitution would be conferring arbitrary and unbridled powers on the Legislature, to deprive a person of his property.

One 'M' too had filed a writ petition before the High Court claiming rights over some of the articles belonging to Roerichs' couple on the strength of a will. The writ petition was dismissed by the High Court holding that the articles claimed by the company 'KTP' stood vested in the State in view of the Roerich and Devika Rani Roerich (Acquisition and Transfer) Act, 1996. Against that judgment, 'M' filed a separate appeal before this Court. 'M' and others had also challenged the constitutional validity of the said Acquisition Act by filing Writ Petitions before the High Court, which too were dismissed.

Aggrieved by the same, they filed another set of civil Appeals before this Court.

The following questions therefore came up for consideration before this Court:

(1) Whether Section 110 of the Karnataka Land Reforms Act, 1961, as amended by the Karnataka Land Reforms amendment Act, 1973, (Act 1 of 1974), which came into effect from 01.03.1974, read with Section 79B of the said Act, introduced by amending Act 1 of 1974, violates the basic structure of the Constitution, in so far as it confers power on the Executive Government, a delegatee of the Legislature, of withdrawal of exemption of Linaloe plantation, without hearing and without reasons;

(2) Whether the Roerich and Devika Rani Roerich (Acquisition and Transfer) Act, 1996 is constitutionally valid;

(3) Whether on true interpretation of Article 300A of the Constitution, the Roerich and Devika Rani Roerich (Acquisition and Transfer) Act, 1996, is violative of the said Article in so far as no specific compensation prescribed for the acquisition of land for Linaloe plantation, and, after deduction of liabilities and payment of compensation for the artefacts, no balance may and/ or is likely to exist for payment of such compensation, as a result of which, whether the Act really is expropriatory in nature;

(4) Whether on true interpretation of Article 300A of the Constitution, the said Act is violative of Article 300A as the said Article is not, by itself, a source of Legislative power, but such power of the State Legislature being traceable only to Entry 42 of List Ill of Schedule VII to the Constitution viz., "Acquisition and Requisition of Property", which topic excludes expropriation and confiscation of property and

(5) If Article 300A of the Constitution is construed as providing for deprivation of property without any compensation at all, or illusory compensation, and hence providing for expropriation and confiscation of property, whether the said Article would violate the rule of law and would be an arbitrary and unconscionable violation of Article 14 of the Constitution, thus violating the basic structure of the Constitution.