Muslim Law:

Muslim Women (Protection of Rights on Divorce) Act, 1986:

Constitution validity - Act excluded Muslim divorced woman from the provisions of Section 125 Cr.P.C. - Further, under S.3 Muslim divorced woman was entitled to reasonable and fair provision and maintenance within the period of iddat by her former husband - Held: The Act is constitutionally valid - Reasonable and fair provision extending beyond the iddat period must be made by the husband within the iddat period - Liability of Muslim husband to pay maintenance to his divorced wife is not confined to iddat period - A divorced Muslim woman, who has not remarried, may proceed against her - relatives for her maintenance - If relatives unable to pay maintenance State Wakf Board to pay such maintenance - The Act does not offend Arts. 14, 15 and 21 - Constitution of India, 1950 Arts. 14, 15 and 21 - Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973, S.125.

Interpretation of Statutes:

Rule of construction - Provisions of a Statute - Possibility of two constructions - Preference of - Held: That construction, if permissible, which makes the Statute effective and operative has to be preferred - Whereas that construction which renders the Statute ultra vires or unconstitutional has to be rejected.

Words & Phrases :

"Divorce woman": and "iddat period" - Meaning of - In the context of S.2(a) of the Muslim Woman (Protection of Rights on Divorce) Act, 1986.

"Maintenance:, "provision" and "mahr" - Meaning of - In the context of S.3 of the Muslim Women (Protection of Rights on Divorce) Act, 1986.

The Petitioners filed a writ petition before this Court challenging the constitutional validity of the Muslim Women (Protection of Rights on Divorce) Act, 1986.

On behalf of the petitioners it was contended that the Act was un-Islamic, unconstitutional and it undermined the secular character which was the basic feature of the Constitution; that there was no rhyme or reason to deprive the Muslim women from the applicability of Section 125 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 and consequently the Act must be held to be discriminatory and violative of Articles 14 and 21 of the Constitution.

On behalf of the respondents it was contended that a reasonable and fair provision and maintenance for the divorced Muslim woman had been provided under Section 3 of the Act; that personal law was a legitimate basis for discrimination; that the Act was good enough to take care of the vagrancy of Muslim divorced woman; that the interpretation of the Act should be in consonance with the Muslim Personal Law; that the social ethos of the Muslims should be borne in mind while interpreting the Act; that the Act resolved all issues and, therefore, the Act was not invalid or unconstitutional.