Constitution of India, 1950 : Article 21-Right to speedy trial-Whether part of fair.just and reasonable procedure implicit in_ Article 21-Whether comprehensive of investigation, inquiry, trial, appeal, revision and retrial-Whether any outer limit could be prescribed for conclusion of the proceeding-Delay-Prosecution to justify and explain-Failure of accused to demand or insist upon speedy trial Whether could result in denial-:-Relief-To be sought first in the high Court--- Court to dispose on priority basis instead of staying the proceedings. Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973: Sections 309 and 482-Right of the accused to speedy trial-inordinate delay in conclusion of proceedings -Discretion of Court to quash proceedings having regard to .attendant circumstances and relevant facts-Guidelines issued.The petitioner in the first of the two Writ Petitions, was the Chief Minister of Maharashtra. The First Respondent has been taking steps to file criminal complaint against the petitioner_ since 1981 for misuse of office and various offences including corruption charges. Initially he was F not successful for want of sanction from the Governor. After obtaining the · required sanction,from the Governor, the Respondent filed a complaint in the Court of Special Judge created under the Criminal Law Amendment Act, 1952, against the petitioner and some others. The main allegation was that the petitioner misused his office for collecting funds for certain trusts. The Special Judge took cognisance of the complaint and issued process. The petitioner appeared before the Special Judge and raised objections, as regards the jurisdiction of the Special Judge. Since the Special Judge overruled the objections, the petitioner.approached the High Court by way of Criminal Revision. In the meantime the State Government issued a notification designating a Special Judge to try the , said case. The Criminal Revision was dismissed. 

Before the Special Judge, the petitioner raised fresh objections that the charges against him were groundless and also because he was an M.L.A. the taking of cognizance without the sanction of the Governor was not valid. He also prayed for postponing the hearing. The Special Judge took the view that without the sanction of the Governor, the case could not go on and accordingly he discharged the accused. The First Respondent B then approached this Court.

This Court took the view that M.L.A. was not a 'public servant' within the meaning of Section 21 IPC and so the question of sanction did not arise. In this view of the matter, it set aside the order of the Special Judge and directed that the trial should proceed from the stage at which the petitioner was discharged. The case was transferred to High Court.

In the connected appeal preferred by the petitioner, this Court confirmed the view that cognizance could be taken even on private complaint.

 In pursuance of the directions of this Court, the Special case was assigned to a Judge of the High Court. The petitioner raised an objection that the case can be tried only by a Special Judge appointed by the Government under the Criminal Law Amendment Act, 1952 and that a High Court Judge had no jurisdiction to try such a case. This and other related objections were rejected by the High Court Judge. The petitioner E appealed against the said order and this Court dismissed the same.

Later, the proceedings were transferred to another Judge of the High Court, who framed 21 charges but declined to frame charges under 22 other heads proposed by the Respondent. The First Respondent approached this Court against the said order in so far as it declined to frame certain charges. This was allowed by this Court. Thereafter, the proceedings were transferred to another Judge of the High Court who framed as many as 79 charges and proceeded with the trial. A number of witnesses were examined. At That stage the petitioner approached this Court ques- tioning the constitutional validity of Section 197 Cr. P.C. Two SLPs were also filed by the petitioner, against the order framing charges and another order. On 29.4.88, this Court quashed all the proceedings in the said special case taken subsequent to the directions of this Court issued in 1984. This resulted in the proceedings becoming non-est after the First Respondent had practically completed his evidence recorded over a period of one year. The case had now to proceed in the Special Court in accordance with Criminal Law Amendment Act, 1952. Since no progress was made in this case, the First Respondent filed an application before this Court to treat A the evidence recorded in the High Court as evidence in the Court of Special Judge. The said application also forms part of the present matters.

Meanwhile, an Advocate filed a Writ Petition before the High Court for a direction to the State Government to designate a Special Judge to try the said special case. The High Court pointed out that in view of this B Court's direction it was necessary for the State Government to notify the appointment of a Special Judge. Accordingly the State Government appointed a Special Judge, and on 16.9.91 the Special Judge issued notices to the parties to appear before him for further steps. Subsequently bailable warrants were issued and the petitioner was granted bail.

In the other Writ Petition, the petitioner, an Advocate, was arrested on 6.7.1975 in connection with the murder of the then Railway Minister and an attempt to murder the then Chief Justice of India. In the first case, charge sheet was filed on 10.11.1975. In the second case the petitioner was convicted and sentenced to four years rigorous imprisonment. Though the petitioner obtained bail in his appeal before the High Court, he could not D be released as he was also involved in the other case. On 30.3.1978, this Court granted bail to the petitioner and also ordered the transfer of the case from Patna to Delhi. Petitioner was produced in the Delhi Chart and charges were framed in January, 1981. The trial took about 5 years in view of the large volume of evidence and several intervening interlocutory proceedings. The prosecution discharged certain witnesses. The petitioner filed an application for summoning some of the witnesses discharged. The trial Court having dismissed the application, the petitioner approached the High Court by way of a Revision Petition. The High Court admitted the Writ Petition and stayed all further proceedings in the trial; the stay continues. 

Both the petitioners preferred the present Writ Petitions for quashing the criminal proceedings on the ground that their fundamental right to speedy trial has been violated. The other matter, viz., the criminal appeal has been preferred by the State of Bihar against the judgment of the High Court of Bihar at Patna.

On behalf of the petitioners, it was contended that they were entitled to speedy trial, the right to which is derived from Article 21 of the Constitution; that to make the right to speedy trial meaningful, enforceable and effective, there ought to be an outer limit beyond which the continuance of the proceedings would be violative of Article 21; that since this Court has already prescribed such an outer limit in the case of children below the age of 16 years, a similar rule has to be evolved for general application.

The appellant-State contended that no proceeding could be quashed on the ground of delay, and the Courts could always ensure speedy trial by issuing suitable directions to the trial court including orders of transfer to a Court where expeditious disposal could be ensured; that while the 'Right to speedy trial' in U.S.A. is express and unqualified, in India it is only a component of justice and fairness; that Article 21 could not be construed as to make a mockery of the directive principles and the Cequality clause; that it is neither permissible nor possible to lay down any outer limit and that there was no precedent warranting such judicial legislation. 

On behalf of Respondent Union of India, it was contended that this Court should not lay down any parameters or guidelines concerning the D right to speedy trial, since the Code of Criminal Procedure contained enough provisions in this regard and Section 482 Cr.P.C. could serve as adequate remedy; and that the petitioners were themselves responsible for the delay in the trial of the cases and that they could not complain of infringement of their right to speedy trial.

 Dismissing the matters, this Court,