Religion / Religious Structure – Ayodhya Matter – Ram Janmabhumi – Babri Masjid dispute – Five suits instituted between 1950 and 1989, centering around dispute of ownership between Hindu community and Muslim community over piece of land admeasuring 1500 square yards in the town of Ayodhya – Hindu community claimed the disputed site to be the birth-place of Lord Ram, referring it as Ram Janmabhumi or Ram Janmasthan and asserting that there existed at the disputed site an ancient temple dedicated to Lord Ram, which was demolished by Mughal Emperor Babur – Muslim community however claimed it as the site of the Babri Masjid (mosque) built by or at the behest of Babur on vacant land – Suit 1 was filed by a worshipper for enforcement of his right to worship Lord Ram at the Janmabhumi – Suit 2 seeking reliefs similar to those in Suit 1 was however subsequently withdrawn – Suit 3 filed by Nirmohi Akhara (representing a religious sect amongst Hindus) was for handing over the management and charge of the Janmabhumi temple to it – Suit 4 filed by Sunni Central Waqf Board was for a declaration that the entirety of the disputed site, including Babri Masjid and the surrounding graveyard, is a public mosque and for a decree for possession – Suit 5 was filed by the deity of Lord Ram and the Janmasthan (both of whom were asserted to be juridical persons) through a next friend impleaded as a third plaintiff for a declaration that the entire premises constitute Ram Janmabhumi and for an injunction against interference in construction of new temple after demolition of the existing building – All the suits were transferred by the High Court to itself – In a split 2:1 verdict, the High Court held that the Hindu and Muslim parties were joint holders of the disputed premises – Each of them was held entitled to one third of the disputed property – Nirmohi Akhara was granted the remaining one third – A preliminary decree to that effect was passed  in the suit brought by the idol and the birth-place of Lord Ram through the next friend – On appeal, held: Disputed site was one composite whole – On balance of probabilities, clear evidence to indicate that worship by Hindus in the outer courtyard of the premises continued unimpeded in spite of the setting up of a grill-brick wall in 1857 by British colonial administration – Hindus established a clear case of a possessory title to the outside courtyard by virtue of long, continued and unimpeded worship at the Ramchabutra and other objects of religious significance – As regards the inner courtyard, evidence on preponderance of probabilities to establish worship by the Hindus prior to annexation of Oudh by the British in 1857 – Muslims offered no evidence to indicate that they were in exclusive possession of the inner structure prior to 1857 – Sunni Central Waqf Board did not establish its case of dedication by user or alternate plea of adverse possession – Existence of the structure of a mosque until 6 December 1992 however does not admit any contestation – Submission that the mosque did not accord with Islamic tenets, also not tenable – Muslims have been wrongly deprived of a mosque which had been constructed well over 450 years ago – While a decree must ensue in Suit 5, Suit 4 (instituted by Sunni Central Waqf Board) must also be partly decreed by allotment of alternate land to the Muslims for construction of a mosque and associated activities – Allotment of land to the Muslims is necessary because though on a balance of probabilities, evidence in respect of possessory claim of the Hindus to the composite whole of the disputed property stands on a better footing than the evidence adduced by the Muslims, the Muslims were dispossessed upon the desecration of the mosque in December 1949 which was ultimately destroyed on 6 December 1992 – Justice would not prevail if the Court were to overlook the entitlement of the Muslims – Direction issued that land admeasuring 5 acres be allotted to Sunni Central Waqf Board either by the Central Government out of the acquired land or by Government of Uttar Pradesh within the city of Ayodhya – This exercise, and the consequent handing over of the land to the Sunni Central Waqf Board, to be conducted simultaneously with the handing over of the disputed site comprising of the inner and outer courtyards as a consequence of the decree in Suit 5 – Suit 4 shall stand decreed in the above terms – Central Government to frame scheme in exercise of powers conferred upon it by ss.6 and 7 (of the Acquisition of Certain Area at Ayodhya Act 1993) to set up a trust or any other appropriate mechanism to whom the land would be handed over in terms of the decree in Suit 5 – Suit 3 filed by Nirmohi Akhara barred by limitation and Nirmohi Akhara’s claim to be a shebait stands rejected – However, having regard to the historical presence of Nirmohi Akhara at the disputed site and their role, direction issued that in framing the scheme, an appropriate role in the management would be assigned to the Nirmohi Akhara – Right of the plaintiff in Suit 1 to worship at the disputed property affirmed subject to restrictions by relevant authorities with respect to maintenance of peace and order and performance of orderly worship – Acquisition of Certain Area at Ayodhya Act 1993 – ss.6 and 7 – Constitution of India, 1950 – Art. 142.

Partition – Ayodhya Matter – Ram Janmabhumi – Babri Masjid dispute – High Court held that the Hindu and Muslim parties were joint holders of the disputed premises – Each of them was held entitled to one third of the disputed property – Nirmohi Akhara was granted the remaining one third – A preliminary decree to that effect was passed in the suit brought by the idol and the birth-place of Lord Ram through the next friend – Decree for partition by High Court – Legality – Held: Three-way bifurcation by the High Court was legally unsustainable – High Court was not seized of a suit for partition – High Court adopted a path which was not open to it and granted reliefs which were not the subject matter of the prayers in the suits – In the process of doing so, it proceeded to assume the jurisdiction of a civil court in a suit for partition, which the suits before it were not – Order VII Rule 7 of CPC does not entitle the court in a civil trial to embark upon the exercise of recasting virtually the frame of a suit, which was undertaken by the High Court – There was no basis in the pleadings before the High Court and certainly no warrant in the reliefs which were claimed to direct a division of the land in the manner that a court would do in a suit for partition – High Court completely erred in granting relief which lay outside the ambit of the pleadings and the cases set up by the plaintiffs in Suit 3 (filed by Nirmohi Akhara), Suit 4 (filed by Sunni Central Waqf Board) and Suit 5 (brought by the idol and the birth- place of Lord Ram through the next friend) – Further, having come to the conclusion that Suit 3 and Suit 4 were barred by limitation, the High Court proceeded to grant relief in Suit 5 to the plaintiffs in Suits 3 and 4 – This defies logic and is contrary to settled principles of law – Moreover, the claim by Nirmohi Akhara was as a shebait who claimed a decree for management and charge – On its own case, Nirmohi Akhara could not have been granted an independent share of the land – Even as a matter of maintaining public peace and tranquillity, the solution which commended itself to the High Court is not feasible – The disputed site admeasures all of 1500 square yards – Dividing the land will not subserve the interest of either of the parties or secure a lasting sense of peace and tranquillity – CPC – Or.VII, r.7.

Places of Worship (Special Provisions) Act 1991 – Object and Purpose – Held: The Act prohibits the conversion of place of worship and imposes a positive obligation to maintain the religious character of every place of worship as it existed on 15 August 1947 – The Places of Worship Act was enacted to secure the fundamental values of the Constitution – Tolerance, respect and acceptance of the equality of all religious faiths is a precept of fraternity – Parliament determined that independence from colonial rule furnishes a constitutional basis for healing the injustices of the past.

Limitation – Ayodhya Matter – Ram Janmabhumi - Babri Masjid dispute – Suit filed by Nirmohi Akhara (representing a religious sect amongst Hindus) for handing over the management and charge of the Janmabhumi temple to it – Maintainability of the suit – Held: The City Magistrate had attached the disputed property by order dated 29th December, 1949 u/s.145 CrPC, 1898 – The suit was filed for restoration of management and charge so as to enable the Nirmohi Akhara to have the benefit of the usufruct in discharge of its obligations towards the deity – It was not a suit for possession – Hence, neither Art.142 nor Art.144 of Limitation Act, 1908 has any application – The suit was governed by provisions of the residuary article, Art.120 – Period of limitation u/Art.120 is six years – Nirmohi Akhara claimed that the cause of action arose on 5th January, 1950 when the receiver appointed by the Magistrate took charge of the property and they were denied charge and management of the temple – Since the suit was instituted on 17th December, 1959 (i.e. after more than nine years) it was outside the prescribed period of limitation and was thus barred – Alternate submission on behalf of Nirmohi Akhara by virtue of s.23 of the Limitation Act, 1908 that denial or obstruction of its’ shebait rights of management and charge was a continuing wrong, also not tenable – Limitation Act, 1908 – Art. 120 – CrPC,1898 – s.145.

Limitation – Ayodhya Matter – Ram Janmabhumi – Babri Masjid dispute – Maintainability of suit – Suit filed by Sunni Central Waqf Board for declaration that entirety of the disputed site, including Babri Masjid and the surrounding graveyard, is a public mosque and for a decree for possession – Whether suit barred by limitation – Held: The grievance of the plaintiffs was that they were in possession and had offered prayers till 23rd December, 1949 on which date it was alleged that the mosque was desecrated – By pleading specifically that the plaintiffs were in possession and had offered prayers until a particular date, the sequitur is that after that date, the plaintiffs ceased to be in possession – The suit in the circumstances was a suit for possession of immovable property falling in the description provided by the first column of Art.142 of the Limitation Act, 1908; and having been instituted on 18th December, 1949, i.e. within a period of twelve years of the date of alleged dispossession on 23rd December, 1949, it was within limitation – Even if the plaintiffs were not in exclusive or settled possession of the inner courtyard of the disputed site, the suit would fall within the residuary Art. 144 in which event also, the suit would be within limitation – Limitation Act, 1908 – Arts. 142 and 144.

Limitation – Ayodhya Matter – Ram Janmabhumi – Babri Masjid dispute – Maintainability of the suit – Suit filed by deity of Lord Ram and Janmasthan (both of whom were asserted to be juridical persons) through a next friend impleaded as a third plaintiff for declaration that the entire premises constitute Ram Janmabhumi and for injunction against interference in construction of new temple after demolition of the existing building – Whether suit barred by limitation – Held: In three earlier suits centering around the dispute, neither of the plaintiffs in the instant suit were impleaded – Case of plaintiffs that institution of the instant suit was necessitated as a result of the deity not being a party to the earlier suits, and on the apprehension that in those suits, personal interests of the leading parties were being pursued without protecting the independent needs and concerns of the deity of Lord Ram, is well and truly borne out  by the proceedings – Cause of action in the instant suit cannot be considered to be barred by limitation on proper construction of the basis of cause of action for institution of the suit – Suit at the behest of the first plaintiff (deity of Lord Ram) who is a juristic person, is within limitation and maintainable – The third plaintiff (next friend) is entitled to represent the first plaintiff.

Limitation Act, 1908 – Art. 142 – Requirements to bring a suit within purview of Art.142 – The suit must be for possession of immovable property; the plaintiff must establish having been in possession of the property; and the plaintiff should have been dispossessed or must have discontinued possession while in possession of the property – For Art.142 to apply, these requirements must cumulatively be established.

Ayodhya Matter – Ram Janmabhumi – Babri Masjid dispute – Suit filed by a worshipper for enforcement of his right to worship Lord Ram at the Janmabhumi – Maintainability of the suit, on death of the original plaintiff – Held: The pleadings indicate that the right asserted was not a private right, but a right in common with and for the benefit of other Hindu devotees to pray at the disputed property – The right claimed was that of the “Hindu public” to worship at the disputed property without undue interference – The right asserted on behalf of the larger “Hindu public” does not stand extinguished upon the death of the original plaintiff and can be pursued by his son who is also a worshipper.

Doctrines / Principles – Doctrine of res judicata – Estoppel – Ayodhya Matter – Ram Janmabhumi – Babri Masjid dispute – An earlier suit filed in 1885 by one Mahant Raghubhar Das for permission to construct a temple on the Chabutra, had been dismissed – Whether the decision operated as res judicata and brought about a bar on filing of subsequent suits centering on the dispute, which gave rise to the appeals in question – Held: No merit in the contention – The parties were distinct – Claim in the earlier suit was distinct – Basis of the claim was not which formed the subject matter of subsequent suits – Similarly, no merit in submission based on doctrine of issue estoppel or estoppel by record.

Religion / Religious structure – Ayodhya Matter – Ram Janmabhumi – Babri Masjid dispute – Idol of Lord Ram – Deity – Shebaitship – Claim of Nirmohi Akhara as shebaits – Tenability – Held: A claim of rights as a de facto shebait must be substantiated with proof that person is in exclusive possession of the trust property and exercises complete control over the right of management of the properties without any let or hindrance from any quarters whatsoever – Though it cannot and has not been denied in the present proceedings that Nirmohi Akhara existed at the disputed site, the claim of Nirmohi Akhara, taken at the highest is that of an intermittent exercise of certain management rights – Their rights were peripheral, usually involving the assistance of pilgrims, and were constantly contested – A stray or intermittent exercise of management rights does not confer upon a claimant the position in law of a de facto shebait – It cannot be said that the acts of Nirmohi Akhara satisfy the legal standard of management and charge that is exclusive, uninterrupted and continuous over a sufficient period of time – Despite their undisputed presence at the disputed site, Nirmohi Akhara is not a shebait for the idols of Lord Ram at the disputed site.

Religion / Religious structure – Ayodhya Matter – Ram Janmabhumi – Babri Masjid dispute – Idol of Lord Ram – Deity – Shebait – Absence of lawfully recognised shebait – Effect – Held: In such a case, it is open for an interested worshipper to sue on behalf of the deity.

Religion / Religious structure – Hindu temple – Idol – Deity – Shebait – Distinction between shebait and pujari – Held: A shebait is vested with the authority to manage the properties of the deity and ensure the fulfilment of the purpose for which the property was dedicated – As a necessary adjunct of this managerial role, a shebait may hire pujaris for the performance of worship – This does not confer upon the appointed pujaris the status of a shebait – As appointees of the shebait, they are liable to be removed from office and cannot claim a right to continue in office.

Religion / Religious structure – Hindu temple – Debutter property – Shebait – de facto shebait and de jure shebait – Held: Where a person claims to be a shebait despite lack of a legal title, relevant enquiry before the Court is whether the person was in actual possession of the debutter property and was exercising all rights of a shebait – Paramount interest in protection of the debutter property underlines the recognition of a de facto shebait. 

Religion / Religious structure – Hindu temple – Debutter property to Idol – Title – Independent claim of shebait – If tenable – Held: Though the shebait may have an interest in the usufruct of the debutter property, the de facto shebait is not vested with an independent right of title over the debutter property – Where a de facto shebait raises an independent claim to the debutter property to the idol, it assumes the position of a trespasser and no action at its behest is maintainable.

Religion / Religious structure – Hindu temple – Idol – Deity – Shebait acting adverse to interests of the deity – Suit by worshipper – Held: Where a shebait acts adverse to the interests of the deity, a worshipper can, as next friend of the deity, sue on behalf of the deity itself, provided that if the next friend’s bona fides are contested, the court must scrutinise the intentions and capabilities of the next friend to adequately represent the deity – The court may do so of its own accord, ex debito justitiae.

Religion / Religious structure – Deity – Juristic personality – Ayodhya matter – Ram Janmabhumi – Babri Masjid dispute – Hindu idol – Juristic personality of the deity of Lord Ram (“Bhagwan Shri Ram Virajman”) – Held: For devotees of Lord Ram, the deity is embodiment of Lord Ram and constitutes the resident deity of Ram Janmabhumi – Oral and documentary evidence shows that Hindu devotees of Lord Ram hold a genuine, long standing and profound belief in the religious merit attained by offering prayer to Lord Ram at the site they believe to be his birth-place – Travel logs in the eighteenth century and early nineteenth century record prevalence of Hindu worship at the disputed site – Factum of Hindu belief in the sanctity of the disputed site established by evidence – The deity has been the object of worship for several hundred years and the underlying purpose of continued worship is apparent even absent any express dedication or trust – Existence of the idol is merely a question of form, or corpus, and legal personality of the deity “Bhagwan Sri Ram Virajman” is not dependent on the continued existence of the idol – Jurisprudence – Juristic Personality.

Religion / Religious structure – Birth-place of deity – Juristic personality – Ayodhya matter – Ram Janmabhumi – Babri Masjid dispute – Birth-place of Lord Ram ‘Asthan Sri Ram Janam Bhumi’ – Juristic personality – Held: Recognition of ‘Asthan Sri Ram Janam Bhumi’ as a juristic person would result in the extinguishment of all competing proprietary claims to the land in question – This conferral of ‘absolute title’ (resulting from the conferral of legal personality on land) would in truth render the very concept of title meaningless – Moreover, the extinguishing of competing claims would arise not by virtue of settled legal principles, but purely on the basis of the faith and belief of the devotees – This cannot be countenanced in law – Jurisprudence – Juristic Personality.

Evidence – Title to land – Ayodhya matter – Ram Janmabhumi – Babri Masjid dispute – Report of Archaeological Survey of India (ASI) – Evidentiary value – Held: Title to the land must be decided on settled legal principles and applying evidentiary standards which govern a civil trial – A finding of title cannot be based in law on the archaeological findings arrived at by ASI – On facts, conclusion in the ASI report about remains of an underlying structure of Hindu religious origin, symbolic of temple architecture of the twelfth century A.D., must be read contextually with caveats.

Evidence – Historical records – Travelogues – Gazetteers – Ayodhya matter – Ram Janmabhumi – Babri Masjid dispute – Rival claims to possessory title – Historical records of travellers – Relevance of – Held: Accounts of the travellers must be read with circumspection – Their personal observations must carefully be sifted from hearsay – matters of legend and lore – Consulting their accounts on matters of public history is distinct from evidence on a matter of title – Contents of gazetteers can at best provide corroborative material to evidence which emerges from the record – The court must be circumspect in drawing negative inferences from what a traveller may not have seen or observed – Title cannot be established on the basis of faith and belief.

Religion / Religious structure – Ayodhya Matter – Ram Janmabhumi - Babri Masjid dispute – Birth-place of Lord Ram – Faith and belief of Hindu devotees – Whether the disputed structure is birth-place of Lord Ram according to the faith and belief of the Hindu devotees – Held (per addenda): Faith and belief of Hindus since prior to construction of Mosque and subsequent thereto has always been that Janmasthan of Lord Ram is the place where Babri Mosque has been constructed which faith and belief is proved by documentary and oral evidence. 

Acts of State – Change in sovereignty – Effect – Held: Municipal courts of the new sovereign will not enforce the legal rights of parties existing under the former sovereign absent an express or implied recognition by the new sovereign of such legal rights – Municipal courts of the new sovereign can embark upon an inquiry as to whether the new sovereign has expressly or impliedly recognised the rights and liabilities existing under a former regime – However, burden to establish the existence and recognition of such rights and liabilities remains on the party claiming them.

Law and Justice – Historical rights and wrongs – Role of Court – Held: Courts of today cannot take cognisance of historical rights and wrongs unless it is shown that their legal consequences are enforceable in the present – The law cannot be used as a device to reach back in time and provide a legal remedy to every person who disagrees with the course which history has taken.

Evidence – Civil Trial – Proof – Preponderance of probabilities – Held: Court in civil trials apply standard of proof governed by preponderance of probabilities – Proof of a fact depends upon probability of its existence – Findings of the court must be based on: (i) test of a prudent person, who acts under the supposition that a fact exists; and (ii) in the context and circumstances of a particular case.

Religion / Religious structure – Place of worship – Title or ownership of composite place of worship – Held: In absence of historical records with respect to ownership or title, the court has to determine the nature and use of the disputed premises as a whole by either of the parties – In determining the nature of use, the court has to factor in the length and extent of use.

Religion / Religious structure – Mosque – Characteristics of mosque in Islamic law – Judicial review – Held: It would be inappropriate for Supreme Court to enter upon an area of theology and to assume the role of an interpreter of the “Hadees” – True test is whether those who believe and worship have faith in religious efficacy of the place where they pray – Courts must steer clear from choosing one among the possible interpretations of theological doctrine and must accept the faith and belief of the worshipper – Any attempt to lead the court to interpret religious doctrine in an absolute and extreme form and question the faith of worshippers must be firmly rejected – Nothing would be as destructive of the values underlying Art.25 of the Constitution – Constitution of India, 1950 – Art.25.

Jurisprudence – Juristic personality – Conferral of – Effect – Held: It does not automatically grant an ensemble of legal rights – The contours of juristic personality i.e. the rights and liabilities that attach upon the object conferred with juristic personality, must be determined keeping in mind the specific reasons for which such legal personality was conferred.

Jurisprudence – Juristic Personality – Idols – Hindu idol and divinity – Contours of legal personality ascribed to a Hindu idol – Held: Conferral of legal personality on a Hindu idol is not conferral of legal personality on divinity itself, which in Hinduism is often understood as the ‘Supreme Being’ – The Supreme Being has no physical presence for it is understood to be omnipresent – the very ground of being itself.

Jurisprudence – Juristic Personality – Idols – Legal characteristics of Hindu idols and the properties associated with them – Held: To provide courts with a conceptual framework within which they could analyse and practically adjudicate upon disputes involving competing claims over endowed properties, courts recognised the legal personality of the Hindu idol – It was a legal innovation necessitated by historical circumstances, the gap in the existing law and by considerations of convenience – It had the added advantage of conferring legal personality on an object that within Hinduism had long been subject to personification – Legal personality of the idol, and the rights of the idol over the property endowed and the offerings of devotees, are guarded by the law to protect the endowment against maladministration by the human agencies entrusted with the day to day management of the idol.

Constitution of India, 1950 – Art. 142 – Scope under – Held: Supreme Court in exercise of its powers u/Art.142 must ensure that a wrong committed must be remedied – This power is not limitless – Power u/Art.142 authorises the court to pass orders to secure complete justice in the case before it – Art.142 embodies both the notion of justice, equity and good conscience as well as a supplementary power to the court to effect complete justice.

Constitution of India, 1950 – Art. 372 – Change of legal regime between British sovereign and the Republic of India – Line of continuity – Art. 372 embodies the legal continuity between the British sovereign and independent India.

Constitution of India, 1950 – Equality – Rule of law – Held: Under the Constitution, citizens of all faiths, beliefs and creeds seeking divine provenance are both subject to the law and equal before the law – The Constitution does not make a distinction between the faith and belief of one religion and another – All forms of belief, worship and prayer are equal.

Constitution of India, 1950 – Equality and Secularism – Held: The Constitution postulates the equality of all faiths – Tolerance and mutual co-existence nourish the secular commitment of our nation and its people.

CrPC, 1898 – s.145 – Nature and scope of proceedings u/s.145 – Held: s.145 proceedings do not purport to decide a party’s title or right to possession of the land – Property held in attachment in proceedings u/s.145 is ‘custodia legis’ – Provisions of s.145 can be invoked only when there is danger of breach of peace – Jurisdiction of Magistrate does not extend to adjudicate into disputed questions of title – Determination of the Magistrate is confined to which party was in actual possession on the date of the order – The real purpose is to decide who has actual physical possession and not legal possession supported by title over the land – To initiate proceedings u/s.145, the Magistrate has to be satisfied of the existence of a dispute which is likely to cause a breach of peace – Enquiry by the Magistrate is of a summary nature, the object being to ensure tranquillity in the locality when the dispute is likely to result in a breach of peace.

Property Law – Immovable property – Dispute – Title – Held: Court does not decide title on basis of faith or belief but on basis of evidence of ownership and possession.

Doctrines / Principles – Doctrine of Justice, Equity and Good Conscience – Applicability – Held: With the development of statutory law and judicial precedent, including progressive codification of customs, the need to place reliance on justice, equity and good conscience gradually reduced – However, where the existing statutory framework is inadequate for courts to adjudicate upon the dispute before them, or no settled judicial doctrine or custom can be availed of, or when parties are not governed by a particular personal law, or when the source of law requires to be supplemented, courts may legitimately take recourse to the principles of justice, equity and good conscience to effectively and fairly dispose of the case.

Doctrines / Principles – Doctrine of lost grant – Applicability – Held: The doctrine supplies a rule of evidence and is applicable in the absence of evidence, due to lapse of time, to prove the existence of a valid grant issued in antiquity – However, the court is not bound to raise the presumption where there is sufficient and convincing evidence to prove possession or when there are no defined grantees – There must be long, uninterrupted and peaceful enjoyment of an incorporeal right – The doctrine of lost grant is different from assertion of rights due to a prolonged custom – Alternate plea of adverse possession is destructive of a valid legal basis to apply the doctrine of lost grant as a rule of evidence – Evidence.

Doctrines / Principles – Doctrine of lost grant – Effect of alternate plea of adverse possession – Held: Adverse possession postulates the vesting of title in one person and the existence of a long continued and uninterrupted possession of another, to the knowledge of and in a manner hostile to, the true title holder – Plea of adverse possession would lead to an inference against the application of the doctrine of lost grant as a plea of adverse possession is premised in title vesting in someone other than the alleged grantee – A person who sets up a plea of adverse possession must establish both possession which is peaceful, open and continuous – possession which meets the requirement of being ‘nec vi nec claim and nec precario’ – To substantiate a plea of adverse possession, the character of the possession must be adequate in continuity and in the public because the possession has to be to the knowledge of the true owner in order for it to be adverse – These requirements have to be duly established first by adequate pleadings and second by leading sufficient evidence – Possession – Adverse Possession – Evidence. 

Evidence Act, 1872 – s.110 – Applicability – Held: s.110 is based on the principle that possession in itself may raise a presumption of title – But this applies when the facts disclose no title in either of the disputants, in which case, possession alone decides – Presumption cannot arise when the facts are known – Possession.

Waqf – Waqf by user – Principles – Express declaration of Waqf, if necessary – Held: Muslim law does not require an express declaration of a Waqf in every case – Dedication resulting in a waqf may also be reasonably inferred from the facts and circumstances of a case or from conduct of the wakif – Doctrine of waqf by user is a doctrine of necessity – The law recognises that where, since time immemorial, worship has been offered at a land with a mosque, the land is presumed to have been dedicated for a religious purpose and even absent a dedication, is waqf by user – However, this may not be extended to the extinguishment of competing and established religious rights of another community in the same property particular in the face of the evidence – Waqf Act, 1995 – s.3(r) – Doctrines / Principles – Doctrine of “waqf by user” – Muslim Law.

Evidence – Pleadings – Effect of inadequate pleadings – Held: Evidence can only be adduced with reference to matters which are pleaded in a civil suit and in the absence of an adequate pleadings, evidence by itself cannot supply the deficiency of a pleaded case.

Words and Phrases – “legal person” – Meaning – Held: To be a legal person is to possess certain rights and duties under the law and to be capable of engaging in legally enforceable relationships with other legal persons – Who or what is a legal person is a function of the legal system – Jurisprudence.