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INDEPENDENT THOUGHT vs. UNION OF INDIA & ANR.

SCR Citation: [2017] 13 S.C.R. 821
Year/Volume: 2017/ Volume 13
Date of Judgment: 11 October 2017
Petitioner: INDEPENDENT THOUGHT
Disposal Nature: Directions Issued
Neutral Citation: 2017 INSC 1030
Judgment Delivered by: Hon'ble Mr. Justice Madan Bhimarao Lokur
Respondent: UNION OF INDIA & ANR.
Case Type: WRIT PETITION (CIVIL) /382/2013
Order/Judgment: Judgment
1. Headnote

Penal Code, 1860 - Exception 2 to s.375:Sexual intercourse between a man and his wife being a girlbetween 15 and 18 years of age - Rape or not - Held: Sexual intercourse with a girl below 18 years of age is rape regardless ofwhether she is married or not - Exception carved out in the PenalCode creates an unnecessary and artificial distinction between amarried girl child and an unmarried girl child and has no rationalnexus with any unclear objective sought lo be achieved - The artificial distinction is arbitrary, discriminatory and not in theinterest of girl child and contrary lo the Arts.15(3), 21 of theConstitution and commitments made in international conventions -Human Rights - Children -Married girl child.Whether there is any incongmi(v between the Exception 2 tos.375 of the /PC ands. 5(n) of the POCSO Act and which provision overrides the other - Held: There is an apparent conflict orincongmi(v between the provisions of Penal Code and the POCSOAct - Whatever be the explanation, given the context and purposeof their enactment, primacy must be given to pro-child statutes overthe /PC as provided for in ss. 5, 41 of the !PC-Further, as provided in s.42A of POCSO. in case of an inconsistency between POCSOand any other law, POCSO will prevail - Statutes concerning therights of the children are special laws concerning a special subjectof legislation and therefore the provisions of such subject-specificlegislation must prevail and take precedence over the provisions ofa general law such as the /PC - There can be no other opinion regarding the pro-child slant of JJ Act as well as the POCSO Act -Protection of Children from Sexual Offences Act, 2012(POCSO) -ss.5(n),42 - Juvenile Justice (Care and Protection of Children) Act,2015.Interpretation of Statutes: Harmonious and PurposiveConstruction - Held: Exception 2 to s.375 of Penal Code to beread in a purposive manner to make it in consonance with thePOCSO Act, the spirit of other pro-child legislations and the humanrights of a married girl child - Therefore, to harmonize system oflaws relating to children, Exception 2 to s.375 of the !PC nowrequired to be meaning/idly read as: "Sexual intercourse or sexualacts by a man with his own wife. the wife not being under eighteenyears ~f age, is not rape".Crime Against Women: Rape - Held: A rapist remains a rapistand marriage with the victim does not convert him into a non-rapist- Similarly, a rape is a rape whether it is described as such or isdescribed as penetrative sexual assault or aggravated penetrativesexual assault - A rape that actually occurs cannot be legislativelybe simply whisked away or legislatively denied as non-existent.Constitution of India :Art. 15(3) - Spirit of - Held: Art. 15(3) cannot and ought notto be interpreted restrictively but must be given its fi11/ play - Fromthis perspective, it is clear that legislation intended for affirmativeaction in respect of a girl child must not only be liberally construedand interpreted but must override any other legislation that seeksto restrict the benefit made available to a girl child.Art.21 - "right to life" - Held (Per Deepak Gupta, J.): Theright to life envisaged in Art.21 is not merely a right to live an animalexistence - This Court has repeatedly held that right to life means aright to live with human dignity - In case of minor girl, it wouldmean her right to grow and develop physically. mentally andeconomically as an independent self sufficient female adult.Art.14 - Exception 2 to s.375 on the touchstone of Art. 14 -Held: (Per Deepak Gupta, J.) When the State on one hand. has. bylegislation laid down that abetting child marriage is a criminaloffence, it cannot, on the other hand defend this classification ofgirls below 18 years on the ground of sanctity of marriage becausesuch classification has no nexus with the object sought to beachieved - Further, the husband is not given the immunity in anyother penal provision except in Exception 2 to s.375 - It does not stand to reason that only for the offence of rape the husband should Abe granted such an immunity especially where the "victim wife" isaged below 18 years i.e. below the legal age of marriage and isalso not legally capable of giving consent to have sexual intercourse- Exception 2 to s.375 is. therefore, discriminatory and violative ofArt.14 of the Constitution.Constitutional validity ~flaw - Held (Per Deepak Gupta, J.):There are se!f imposed limitations laid down by the Court whiledeciding the issue whether a law is constitutional or not - If thelegislature enacts a law which is violative of the fundamental rightsof the citizens, is arbitrary and discriminatory, then the Court wouldbe failing in its duty if it does not either strike down the law or readdown the law in such a manner that it falls within the four cornersof the Constitution.Prohibition of Child Marriage Act, 2006 (PCMA) - Scopeand amplitude of - Held (Per Deepak Gupta, J.): PCMA is a secularAct- It being a special Act dealing with children, the provision of Dthis Act will prevail over the provisions of both the Hindu MarriageAct, 1955, Muslim Marriages and Divorce Act, 1939 in so far aschildren are concerned.Interpreting the provisions, the Court

2. Case referred
3. Act
      No Data Found!!!!!
4. Keyword
  • Penal Code
  • 1860 - Exception 2 to s.375: Sexual intercourse between a man and his wife being a girl between 15 and 18 years of age
5. Equivalent citation
    Citation(s) 2017 AIR 4904 = 2017 (10) SCC 800 = 2017 (10) Suppl. SCC 800 = 2018 (1) JT 208 = 2018 (1) Suppl. JT 208 = 2017 (12) SCALE 621