Labour Law:

Employees' Provident Fund and Miscellaneous Provisions Act, 1952:

Section-14-B-Employees' provident fund contributions-Delay in remittance-Damages-Recovery of-Period of limitation---Applicability-Held : The Act does not prescribe a period of limitation for assessment or recovery of damages.

Section 14-B-Damages-Levy of-Delay in passing the order-Irretrievable prejudice arising due to-Plea of-Held: Such a plea must be taken before the department and proved-If the plea is rejected the same cannot be raised before the High Court unless clearly pleaded-Mere delay in initiating action under S. 14-B does not amount to prejudice-Constitution of India, 1950, Arts. 226 and 227-Practice and Procedure.

Section 14-B-Damages-Levy of-Delay in passing order-Held: Does not amount to waiver. Section I 4-B-Employees' provident fund contributions-Delay in remittance-Explanation for-Held: Power cut, strike, financial problems, delay in realisation of cheques or drafts etc. are not valid grounds to escape liability.

Section 14-B-Employees' provident fund contributions-Delay in remittance-Order for recovery of damages-Passed after a long period-Held: By itself does not vitiate the order of recovery damages.

Employees' Provident Fund Scheme, 1952 :

Paragraph 32(3)-Legal fiction-Held: Creates a fiction of entrustment -Penal code, 1860, S. 495 Expln. I. Constitution of India, 1950: Article 226.

Writ petition---Dismissal of-In limine - Reasons for-Held: Ought to H be given, at least briefly, by High Court.

The appellant delayed the remitting of employees' provident fund contribution within the period stipulated in paragraph 38. 10 of the Employees' provident fund Scheme, 1952. The Regional Provident fund Commissioner, after a lapse of 14 years, levied damages under Section 14-B of the Employees' Provident fund and Miscellaneous Provisions Act, 1952.

The appellant filed a writ petition before the High Court challenging the aforesaid levy, which was dismissed in limine by a non-speaking order merely saying "dismissed." Hence this appeal.

On behalf of the appellant it was contended that the demand notice c issued in respect of the alleged belated payment was arbitrary and unreasonable that a period of limitation must be implied under the law for it would be wholly unreasonable to allow the power of recovery of damages to be exercised after a considerable lapse of time and that the demand was dropped in 1971 and, therefore, it must be deemed to have been waived.